Latino Race Cards: Negative Racial Appeals in Contemporary Campaigns and the Bounds of Racial Priming Theory by Lisi, Rebecca
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst 
Doctoral Dissertations Dissertations and Theses 
October 2021 
Latino Race Cards: Negative Racial Appeals in Contemporary 
Campaigns and the Bounds of Racial Priming Theory 
Rebecca Lisi 
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2 
 Part of the American Politics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lisi, Rebecca, "Latino Race Cards: Negative Racial Appeals in Contemporary Campaigns and the Bounds 
of Racial Priming Theory" (2021). Doctoral Dissertations. 2242. 
https://doi.org/10.7275/24599237 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2/2242 
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@library.umass.edu. 
 
Latino Race Cards: Negative Racial Appeals in Contemporary Campaigns and the 









Submitted to the Graduate School of the 
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment 




























































© Copyright by Rebecca Lisi 2021  
All Rights Reserved 
Latino Race Cards: Negative Racial Appeals in Contemporary Campaigns and the 





































To Damian and Lucien,  
 
who, for years, patiently and generously shared me with both this graduate program and 




As a non-traditional student, living off-campus, and with numerous competing 
obligations between family, studies, teaching, and public service, my progress through 
this doctoral program was long and winding. I started the doctoral program several years 
after my undergraduate education in a different field. I was inspired by my work on the 
ground as a political organizer for the citizen’s lobby group, Clean Water Action, and 
wanted to study politics and public policy academically in the (naive) hopes of gleaning 
insights for how we might make our politics more effective and democratic. In 2008, I 
started my first year as an elected official on the Holyoke City Council and began my 
graduate career at the same time. That same year I got married to my husband, Damian, 
who started his own graduate program in a different state. A few years later, Damian and 
I welcomed our son, Lucien, who presented us with new joys and challenges for keeping 
up with this balancing act. Over my many years in the program, areas of scholarly 
interest waxed and waned; methodological and epistemological commitments matured; 
and an identity as a scholar-practitioner developed. I am grateful for my experience as a 
doctoral student in the University of Massachusetts, Amherst’s Department of Political 
Science and many have contributed to my progress and success there. 
I am indebted to Professor Scott Blinder for recognizing that life was happening 
alongside my scholarship. Scott provided me with kind and understanding support that 
motivated me to build up the time and confidence required to complete my project. His 
ability to create structure and offer meaningful feedback was very much appreciated and 
an essential part of my ability to make progress, no matter how incrementally, on writing 
the dissertation. In the end, I’m glad that he and other committee members decided it was 
1
appropriate for him to be take on the position of Chair for my dissertation committee and 
be recognized for the important role he played in helping to move my project to 
completion. 
I am grateful for Professor Brian Schaffner confidence in my scholarship and 
analytical skills which was often far greater than the confidence I had in my own abilities. 
Brian also has the impressive ability to breakdown the most complex concepts and 
analyses into simple, easy-to-follow steps which makes him an outstanding methods 
professor. I appreciate the early work he did to help me design the survey experiment 
used for this study as well as his support in drafting the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant (DDRIG) that funded my 
model in the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES). 
I wish to thank Tatishe Nteta for nurturing the seminal ideas that lead to the 
formalization of this project. As an early mentor, Tatishe helped me locate the racial 
priming literature in which I could situate the information and experiences I was both 
witness to and participating in on the ground level of practical politics. Tatishe wrote 
countless letters in support of my research and scholarship for which I was awarded 
numerous grants. His many letters, support, and advocacy for my academic progress 
helped me to move successfully through the entirety of the doctoral program. 
I wish to acknowledge Mari Castañeda and Linda Isbell for modeling what 
woman and mothers in academia can accomplish and for witnessing and validating my 
own experiences. Mari has also always provided wonderful insights for how academic 
scholarship and community activism can work to inform one another—a contribution that 
is often overlooked, but essential for someone like me who tries to make sense of politics 
2
at the periphery of both scholarship and practice. Although Linda never became a formal 
member of the dissertation committee, she supported me as if she were and helped to 
remind me of ways to keep the dissertation project tractable. 
I would like to thank the Department of Political Science at the University of 
Massachusetts, Amherst for accepting me into the doctoral program and for the years of 
Teaching Assistantships and grant funding that supported my financial ability to remain 
in the program. I thank the many professors in the Department who contributed to both 
my academic advancement and the skills training that I developed over the course of the 
program. 
The Graduate School at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst supported my 
research and writing progress with direct grant awards as well as entrance into a 
Dissertation Writing Retreat. I also benefited from indirect support for academic progress 
through the many writing, teaching, and professional development workshops provided 
by the Graduate School. 
I am honored to have been awarded the Doctoral Dissertation Research 
Improvement Grant from the NSF (Award 1560658) which made possible the purchase 
of a full survey experiment module in the 2016 CCES. I am grateful for the support of 
Karen Mason, at the UMass Amherst Institute for Social Science Research, who helped 
me draft the budget proposal and meet the NSF proposal requirements. 
There are many graduate student colleagues who over the years provided 
comradery, study group, and writing group supports. Special thanks to Melinda Tarsi for 
her friendship and help through many academic conferences and the completion of 
coursework. As writing, for me, is often a difficult, solitary endeavor, I am grateful for 
3
Gaby Stevenson and Ivelisse Cuevas who both provided me with motivational 
companionship. I am even more thankful for the opportunity I had to cultivate deep, 
meaningful friendships with each of them. 
I thank my family for all the different ways they supported me through this 
journey. I thank my parents, Joseph and Ellen, for providing me with a diverse set of 
identities through which I developed the social justice perspective and orientation that 
informed my research. I am grateful to my husband, Damian, for supporting every 
decision along the way 120%, who never judged or put deadlines on my progress, and 
who believed in my ability to complete the program even in times when I was doubtful. 
And special thanks to my son, Lucien, who offered so many opportunities to re-set, re-
calibrate, and keep priorities in focus. 
Finally, I wish to express my deepest wishes of gratitude to Professor John 
Brigham, to whom I owe my entire path into academia. John has been both a friend and 
mentor. He always emphasized the value of my contributions as a scholar-practitioner. 
John has a generous academic spirit that allows him to see the interesting in the mundane 
and latent, bright scholars in each of his students. Had our paths never crossed, I would 
not have applied to the Political Science program and would not have had the privilege 
and opportunity to pursue this path that has enriched my life in so many ways. 
 
 
Disclaimer: Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in 
this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
National Science Foundation. 
4
ABSTRACT 
LATINO RACE CARDS: NEGATIVE RACIAL APPEALS IN CONTEMPORARY 
CAMPAIGNS AND THE BOUNDS OF RACIAL PRIMING THEORY 
SEPTEMBER 2021 
REBECCA LISI, B.S., STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BINGHAMTON 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Scott Blinder 
 
The Implicit Explicit (IE) model of racial priming (Mendelberg 2001) continues to be the 
dominant theoretical model for understanding the impact of negative racial campaign 
appeals on white voter mobilization despite significant demographic change in the United 
States. The theoretical underpinnings of the IE model rest upon a norm of racial equality 
which emerged in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement. Given the specific racial and 
historical context in which this racial norm developed it is unclear whether the IE model 
can account for the impact of non-Black racial appeals on white voter mobilization. I apply 
the concept of “foreigner positionality” to argue that this egalitarian racial norm does not 
extend to account for behaviors directed toward Latinos in contemporary politics. 
Additionally, the hyper-partisan and hyper-racialized context in which contemporary 
campaigns take place may have altered the perception of what constitutes a racial appeal. 
Using a nationally representative sample of non-Hispanic, white adults from the 2016 
CCES, I employ a comparative survey experiment to test whether similar rhetorical-visual 
constructions of anti-Black and anti-Latino appeals have differential impacts on white 
5
voters’ candidate favorability ratings. The results demonstrate that the norm of racial 
equality does not extend beyond African Americans; that there appears to be partisan 
bifurcation around the adherence and maintenance of a norm of ‘African American’ 
equality; and raise significant questions about the assumption that the decision to express 
primed racial thinking occurs at an unconscious level.  
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"[Trump] here is one of the most racist presidents we've had in modern 
history. He pours fuel on every single racist fire … This guy has a dog 
whistle as big as a foghorn."  
 
—Vice President Biden during the first presidential debate, October 2020 
 
"In Trump’s rhetoric, only people who speak of racial obligation are 
beholden to such judgments."  
 





 Donald Trump’s presidential campaign was marked by numerous inflammatory 
statements about racial and ethnic minorities. The most infamous of these remarks was 
the explicitly racist comments regarding Mexican immigrants he made during his 2015 
presidential campaign announcement:  
“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best... They’re 
sending people that have lots of problems and they’re bringing those 





Political scholars and pundits alike were stunned—not only by the fact that Trump dared 
to defy conventional norms of racial equality and political correctness by making 
explicitly racial appeals, but also by the extent to which he was able to make such 
remarks on a national platform without suffering significant electoral consequences. In an 
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NPR Morning Edition broadcast, Jason Stanley, professor of political speech at Yale 
University said that Trump's ability to break rules, and get away with it, is an expression 
of power. “He's communicating, ‘I'm not held to the norms that anyone else is,’” said 
Stanley (McCammon 2016).  
Many critics on the political left indeed railed against Trump and decried his 
remarks as racist. In response to this outcry, media outlets on such as Univision and 
NBCUniversal among other smaller networks cut ties with Trump and pulled any 
programming or ad space associated with the presidential candidate (Boguhn, López, and 
Calvert 2015). Though, many “leading Republicans were slow to condemn his remarks… 
hoping that inattention would help him fade from the headlines” (Peoples 2015). When 
condemnation from the right was finally forthcoming, it was coupled with statements of 
support as Fox News and individual Republican elites defended Trump’s remarks.  
Fox News host, Sean Hannity, declared that Trump’s remarks were not racist and 
pointed to immigration from Mexico and Latin America and drug trafficking as serious 
issues facing the nation: “Floor-to-ceiling drugs confiscated by people crossing our 
southern border. You want to talk about crime?” said Hannity (Boguhn, López, and 
Calvert 2015). Other Republican presidential candidates also denied Trump’s racism and 
expressed that there was some truth to what he was saying. Senator Ted Cruz offered 
praise to Trump for highlighting important border issues, “‘I salute Donald Trump for 
focusing on the need to address illegal immigration,’ Cruz told host Chuck Todd on 
NBC's ‘Meet The Press.’ ‘I like Donald Trump. He is bold, he is brash.’” (Bolton 2015). 
Trump for his part refused to back down, claiming that his remarks were in fact, 
“totally accurate" (Landy 2015). As a result, much of the electorate seemed unfazed by, 
13
or at least unsure, about how to respond to Trump’s rhetoric. President Trump continued 
to peddle racist tropes throughout his presidency, e.g.: nicknaming the COVID-19 
coronavirus, the “China-virus;” using “Pocahontas” as slur to address Massachusetts 
Senator Elizabeth Warren; and calling white, armed protestors in Charlottesville, Virginia 
“very fine people.”  A pattern of divided responses to these sorts of racial appeals among 
political elites, and the contestation of what even constitutes a racial appeal, has sparked a 
renewed interest in the research questions that are most central to the debate on racial 
priming in the political science literature. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This example of Trump’s embolden racial rhetoric about Mexicans in the United 
States flies in the face of what political scientists have established as the normative 
practices surrounding racial campaign communications over the past twenty years. The 
implicit-explicit (IE) model of racial priming (Mendelberg 2001) states that since the 
Civil Rights era, a norm of racial equality has been established that precludes candidates 
from making explicitly racial appeals without suffering significant electoral 
consequences. Instead, successful racial campaign appeals must be implicit, “dog 
whistles” that tangentially or incidentally reference race and activate racial considerations 
outside of the voters’ awareness. Trump’s racist rhetoric challenges key assumptions 
regarding the successful construction and acceptance of campaign appeals made by a 
candidate for elected office, especially one with a national presence. As a result, this 
seemingly anomalous campaign rhetoric has sparked a renewed interest in the research 
questions that are most central to the debate on racial priming in political science. 
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This study takes up several questions related to the challenge that Trump’s 
rhetoric presents to the standards within the racial priming literature and its implications 
for egalitarian racial norms in the United States: 1) Do voters continue to punish 
candidates who make explicitly racist remarks? And does the racial group targeted by the 
racist remark influence how strongly a candidate is penalized? 2) What makes implicit 
appeals successful—do they work at a conscious or subconscious level? 3) In the context 
of extreme partisan polarization, do Republicans and Democrats respond differently to 
explicit and/or implicit racial appeals? I address each of these questions through a multi-
disciplinary approach that reviews the extant political science literature on racial priming 
while also weaving in insights from sociology and communications. I develop my own 
theory of Persistent Foreigner Positionality (PFP) to explain why Latinos1 and other non-
Black minorities are not encompassed by the norm of racial equality and how as a result, 
the normative constraints that would otherwise stem whites’ racialized thinking are not 
established.  
Major demographic shifts have increased the salience of other racial groups 
alongside Blacks in American politics. In particular, the Latino population surpassed 60 
million in 2019 and has accounted for more than half (52%) of the United States’ 
population growth since 2010 (Noe-Bustamante, Lopez, and Krogstad 2020). This begs 
the question as to whether the IE model works to mobilize white political opinion when 
Latinos, or non-Black minority groups as opposed to Blacks are featured in negative 
racial campaign appeals? 
 
1 The term “Latino” is typically understood as a pan-ethnic identifier. However, I argue here that this 
ethnic group has been racialized in the U.S. context in such a way that flattens out the various national 
origin and citizenship distinctions held by individuals within the homogenous, ascriptive identifier 
“Latino.” 
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Additionally, since the election of President Obama, race and racial identities are 
increasingly discussed in an explicit manner by political campaigns and the media 
(Achen and Bartels 2016; Goldman and Mutz 2014; Parker and Barreto 2013; Sides, 
Tesler, and Vavreck 2018; Tesler 2012, 2016; Tesler and Sears 2010; Valentino, 
Newburg, and Neuner 2019). Recent research on anti-Black appeals fails to confirm the 
findings of the IE model (Valentino et al 2018; Reny et al 2019). However, it is unclear 
theoretically why these studies find empirically undistinguished impacts for implicit and 
explicit appeals. Valentino and colleagues (2017) argue that this is due to an increased 
tolerance for explicit, anti-Black appeals among the electorate and especially so in “safe” 
Republican districts. While Reny and co-authors (2019) argue that implicit appeals have 
lost their power to prime and are performing more like explicit appeals due to the 
electorate’s familiarly with race and racial tropes in the hyper-polarized and hyper-
racialized context of contemporary racial appeals. 
The answers to these questions have profound implications; not only for the 
maintenance of racial egalitarian norms and beliefs, but also for the status and lived 
experiences of Black Americans and/or other non-Black minorities in the United States. 
A waning norm of racial equality would allow explicitly racist and derogatory language 
to go unchecked in public discourse and media reports. Such rhetoric could quickly lead 
to a resurgence of beliefs that Blacks or other racial groups are intrinsically inferior. A 
proliferation of such negative stereotypical beliefs and their reification by the rhetoric of 
political elites could be used to justify the exclusion of Blacks or other minorities from 
education, housing, employment, or any number of opportunities that they would 
otherwise be entitled to as citizens. 
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Understanding whether people respond in a conscious or unconscious manner to 
racial appeals is important when considering how to combat racism and in developing 
effective anti-racist interventions. If people are moved to act on racial animus because 
priming occurs unconsciously through coded appeals as described in the IE model, then 
Mendelberg’s (2001) remedy to combat the appeal by making it explicit should be 
sufficient (see also Nteta, Lisi, and Tarsi 2016; Mendelberg and Tokeshi 2015). However, 
over the course of a campaign, how can one ensure that the same individuals who 
received the initial subconscious prime are later exposed to the explicit corrective (before 
a primed expressive act takes place)? Conversely, if the expression of primed racial 
thinking is a conscious act, then what information are message recipients using to decide 
when it is safe or appropriate to register negative racial sentiments? There continues to be 
much to unpack regarding the mechanism by which priming occurs, the answers to which 
would have implications for the development, strength, and maintenance of norms. 
Relatedly, given the partisan polarization around race and racial issues, it is 
possible that partisan attachments may trump normative considerations in this issue 
arena. Presently, it appears as though the norm of racial equality is bifurcated along party 
lines. The racial egalitarianism is in retrenchment among Republicans, allowing them to 
evade its normative constraints, while racially liberal Democrats continue to adhere to the 
norm. What does it mean for electoral politics if only one party alone is bound to the 
norms of racial egalitarianism? What rhetorical strategies worked to undermine the norm 
of racial equality among Republicans? Given the electoral incentives associated with 
abandoning the norm, are there rhetorical strategies that could fortify or reassert the norm 
from the political/racial left? 
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In undertaking the first question regarding the IE model’s contemporary relevance 
for Blacks and Latinos, I develop a theory called Persistent Foreigner Positionality. The 
first premise of my theory of PFP rests on the claim that what has become known in the 
racial priming literature as the “norm of racial equality” (Mendelberg 2001) is actually a 
misnomer. According to Mendelberg (2001, p. 17-18) the dominance of norm of racial 
equality is born out of the Civil Rights era which was marked by unprecedented support 
for federal legislation, judicial rulings, and unified elite rhetoric that advanced the notion 
of African American equality. While these legislative and judicial outcomes had legal 
implications for all racial, ethnic, and gender groups, the normative and legal changes 
were ushered in by what was ostensibly a Black movement and it is not clear whether the 
established norms of equality extend beyond Blacks to encompass other racial groups. 
In addition to the problems with assuming that an overarching norm of racial 
equality was established in the wake of the civil rights movement, there is further reason 
to believe that the IE fails to extend to explain the impact of racial appeals featuring non-
Blacks. The theory of racial triangulation (Kim 1999) describes the ways in which 
minority groups are racialized relative to one another in the United States and thus 
occupy unique racial positions. The racial triangulation of Latinos, in particular, casts the 
group in a “foreigner” position that is socially constructed as undeserving of the 
treatment, protections, and benefits citizens receive as members of the body politic. 
Therefore, my theory of Persistent Foreigner Positionality asserts that explicit negative 
references to Latinos that play up perceptions of a cultural threat are deemed legitimate 
by majority of white Americans as opposed to violations of an egalitarian racial norm that 
warrant rejection. In the view of PFP then, political elites who leverage campaign 
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strategies that make use of explicit negative rhetoric featuring Latinos, are rewarded with 
positive favorability ratings and electoral support. 
At the heart of the second question is an interest in better understanding the 
priming mechanism that gives implicit appeals their power which is a heretofore 
underexplored area within the priming literature. According to the IE model, implicit, or 
coded, appeals are successful because they subconsciously prime racial animus that is 
then expressed through political opinion and behavior. However, recent studies attribute 
the failure to replicate the IE model findings to competing causes. On the one hand, 
Valentino and colleagues (2018) argue that the electorate has become more tolerant of 
explicit appeals. On the other hand, Reny and colleagues (2019) argue that implicit 
appeals are perceived as explicit in the hyper-racialized political context in which 
contemporary campaign communications take place. In either case, there is an indication 
that voters are consciously evaluating the racial appeal content and making calculated 
decisions about how to respond. 
Digging deeper into Mendelberg’s (2001) psychology of implicit appeals, I work 
to understand whether and how its four axioms—ambivalence, awareness, accessibility, 
and ambiguity—are expressed in a “most racial” (Tesler 2016) political context. If code 
words are more easily understood in a hyper-racialized political information 
environment, then the ambiguity of the implicit appeals is lost, and it would not work at a 
subconscious level. I develop a novel treatment manipulation I call a tacit appeal, that 
seeks to preserve the ambiguity of a racial appeal, by priming racialized thinking with 
images alone. If tacit appeals are more successful that implicit appeals, it may help 
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reinforce the notion that the subconscious activation of racial considerations contribute to 
the success of racial appeals.  
Also, I link the concept of racial resentment to individual levels of ambivalence. 
According to the IE model, white voters are susceptible to racialized thinking because 
negative racial stereotypes are maintained alongside the norm of racial equality. The 
presence of both positive and negative attributes in a racial schema causes a tension that 
can be exploited by racially coded candidate appeals. This tension presupposes that the 
positive and negative attributes that make up a racial schema are roughly on balance with 
one another and that subconscious racial cues will shift the balance only in a negative 
direction. However, we know that through the range of possible racial resentment scores, 
an individual’s racial schema may be weighted either in the direction of negative 
attributes (racial conservatism), positive attributes (racial liberalism), or even equally 
positive and negative attributes (racial ambivalence). The direction of the weight of 
attitude objects associated with one’s racial schema will make racially resentful 
individuals more predisposed to priming effects, whereas others will be more resistant. 
Likewise, individual levels of racial resentment can only reflect a unique 
constellation of the group-specific stereotypes and attitude objects available in the socio-
political information environment. In the case of Black Americans, the Civil Rights 
Movement successfully created a new norm of racial egalitarianism that is available for 
individuals to draw from when developing an individual-level Black racial schema. 
Meaning, that Black ambivalence is at least a possibility because the negative 
stereotyping sits alongside racial egalitarianism at a societal level, though individuals 
may assign different magnitudes and/or valences to those oppositional attributes to arrive 
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at different levels of racial resentment. For Latinos however, it is not clear whether 
ambivalence is as strong a possibility for individual-level racial schemas given the 
absence of well-established Latino norm of equality. As a result, I expect that there will 
be less tension among countervailing attitude objects and therefore, less variation among 
the various Latino appeal conditions. 
Finally, the distinct pattern of partisan reactions in disavowing Trump’s racist 
rhetoric and the polarization of racial attitudes across party lines, I inquire as to whether 
Republican and Democratic voters are equally committed to egalitarian racial norms. 
Valentino and colleagues’ (2018) work suggests that redistricting and an increased 
awareness of white racial identity has ushered in the “end of racial priming” for 
contemporary campaigns in which explicit anti-Black appeals are no longer disavowed. 
Likewise, this study takes seriously the notion that both social norms and electoral 
coalitions may change over time, but also considers that they may do so unevenly across 
geographic space (voting districts) and/or party coalitions.  
Furthermore, Partisan Motivated Reasoning (PMR) and the IE model each purport 
that voter commitments to their partisan identification and to the norm of racial equality, 
respectively, supersede other information in expressing political attitudes and behaviors. 
What should we expect when voters must process information that creates a tension or 
disagreement out of those commitments? By disaggregating candidate appeals by 
partisanship, I glean important insights into the ways that co- and cross-partisan appeals 




NOTES ON THE SURVEY EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
Survey experiments are well established in the literature on racial priming as a 
method for understanding the impact of racial appeals on respondent attitudes, opinions, 
and behavior. When fielded with large, representative samples, survey experiment 
research designs can establish generalizable causal effects. The random assignment of 
respondents to control and treatment conditions affords researchers a high degree of 
confidence that the individual manipulations embedded in the treatments are responsible 
for observed changes in the sample’s responses. Following the conventions of the 
literature and insights gleaned over time to improve experimental design, I take numerous 
steps to increase the external validity of the results of the survey instrument. 
In this study, I utilize a survey experiment design embedded in the 2016 
Cooperative Congressional Elections Survey (CCES) administered by YouGov through 
an online survey platform2. This survey experiment directly and comparatively assesses 
the impact of various Black and Latino racial appeals on candidate favorability. It directly 
assesses the impact of exposure of various racial campaign appeals on respondent 
candidate favorability scores as opposed to elite interpretations of an appeal’s racial 
content. In recent years, the racial priming literature has drifted toward an interest in 
respondent reactions to elite opinions on racial appeals. My study refocuses attention on 
reactions to the campaign appeals themselves. The survey experiment is also designed 
with parallel conditions for each Black and Latino appeal which allows for a comparative 
assessment of how particular rhetorical-visual constructions work across racial groups. 
 
2 Participation in the 2016 CCES was made possible by a Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement 
Grant (DDRIG) funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF, Award Number: 1560648). 
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Recently, some scholars have raised concerns about the ways in which the racial 
intent of implicit appeals may be more easily perceived by voters in the hyper-racialized 
political context of contemporary political media and campaigns (Reny, Valenzuela, and 
Collingwood 2019; Tesler 2016). According to the IE model, the power of implicit 
appeals rests in their ability to go undetected and unconsciously activate negative racial 
predispositions (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). While my 
study, in part, challenges the notion that implicit appeals are effective because their racial 
content remains beneath conscious awareness, I do take care to offer a treatment 
condition that contains more a more subtle racial prime than even the implicit appeal in 
order to achieve a high degree of ambiguity. My survey experiment includes an original 
concept that I call a “tacit” appeal which aims to prime racial predispositions with racial 
images alone and is paired with race-neutral rhetoric that refers to the visually featured 
group only as “people” (in both the Black and Latino conditions). The tacit condition is 
an attempt to deal with the increased salience of race and racial identities in politics and 
the media, especially since the Obama presidency (Tesler 2016) while also 
acknowledging the requirement of “ambiguity” and “plausible deniability” (Mendelberg 
2001) that undergirds the rhetorical-visual construction of implicit appeals. 
In this survey experiment, I expose respondents to a series of mailers from a 
fictional member of Congress, Don Williams, campaigning for re-election in his fictional 
Indiana district. The two issue mailers are presented sequentially, in order to closely 
replicate the multiple-mailer information environment experienced in real-world 
campaigns and enhance the experiment’s external validity. The first mailer communicates 
visual information about the fictional candidate (white, middle-aged man), identifies his 
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district, and basic Election Day information. The second, is the Voter ID issue mailer that 
contains the rhetorical-visual treatment manipulations. Candidate party affiliation is 
randomized by presenting a preamble text on the screen preceding the mailer sequence. 
The presentation of multiple mailers helps to obscure the location of the treatment stimuli 
whose impacts I am interested in measuring. 
When this survey was fielded in 2016 voter ID laws had been pursued in multiple 
state legislatures, received a lot of media attention throughout that presidential campaign 
year, and was thought to enjoy bi-partisan support.3 Although voter identification 
campaigns were often advanced with race-neutral imagery and rhetoric, research has 
demonstrated that support for voter ID laws is responsive to racialized thinking (Wilson 
et al. 2014) and that the proposal and passage of state-level legislation is correlated to the 
state’s racial composition (Bentele and O’Brien 2013). Another important value 
presented by the voter ID issue is that it possesses a degree of bot “issue parity” and 
“issue congruence” (Reny, Valenzuela, Collingwood 2019) for both Blacks and Latinos. 
It is an issue that can be applied rather evenly to both groups and that support for the 
issue and the sponsoring candidate will be highly responsive to racial priming effects. It 
is also a more contemporary debate that steps away from highly charged issues of crime 
or welfare spending for Blacks and immigration for Latinos.  
Finally, it is important to note that racial appeals are likely to be perceived 
differently by different racial groups and that this study is limited to an inquiry of the 
impact of Black and Latino appeals on non-Hispanic, white Americans. The study of 
 
3Recent research suggests that elite opinions on the voter ID issue bifurcated along party lines as early as 
2008 (Gronke et al. 2019). However, public opinion polling (i.e: PBS NewsHour/NPR 2021; Monmouth 
University Polling Institute 2021) continues to register high levels of bi-partisan support for voter 
identification laws. 
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political opinion and behavior in the United States has begun to forge a systematic 
approach to understanding the diversity of perspectives held among different racial and 
ethnic groups (see for example, Masuoka and Junn 2013; Nteta 2013). For example, 
within the priming literature, White (2007) takes up the question of how Black and white 
voters respond to negative racial appeals that target African Americans. White (2007) 
finds that contrary to whites, whose anti-Black affect is primed only by implicit appeals, 
for Blacks, in-group identity is primed only by explicit references to the group. There is 
value in studying an array of respondent group-target group pairings which the racial 
priming literature has not taken up very regularly. However, I am focused on white 
Americans as group for two reasons. First, because they are most susceptible to negative 
racial appeals. Also, white Americans’ reactions to racial appeals are deeply important to 
understand as the group continues to enjoy a structural position of power in U.S. society 
and from this privileged position their political opinions and behaviors can have 




 Chapter 2 presents my theory of Persistent Foreigner Positionality (PFP) 
to explain why Latinos (and other non-Black minorities) are not encompassed by the 
norm of racial equality and how, as a result, the normative constraints that would 
otherwise stem whites’ racialized thinking are not established for Latinos. My theory of 
PFP builds directly upon Claire Jean Kim’s (1999) theory of racial triangulation and 
weaves together various, disparate literatures that provides a scaffolding for new 
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perspectives and syntheses related to the implicit-explicit model of racial priming. In 
doing so, Persistent Foreigner Positionality articulates they ways in which Latinos occupy 
a racial position that is distinct from Black Americans and explains why the normative 
and psychological requisites of the IE model are not present when the theory of racial 
priming is applied to Latinos. 
 In Chapter 3, I introduce the foundation of the survey experiment that focuses on 
the relevance of the IE model using a comparative design that focuses on implicit and 
explicit, Black and Latino appeals. Drawing on racial priming studies and the theory of 
racial triangulation (Claire Jean Kim 2001) my theory of permanent foreigner 
positionality (PFP) asserts that racial priming has been predicated upon notion of racial 
equality that has been mistakenly conflated with “African American equality.” As a 
result, I hold a deep skepticism about the ability of the IE model to extend beyond 
African Americans to non-Black racial and ethnic groups. In this study, I focus on 
Latinos whose political salience has increased over the past decade alongside 
demographic shifts (Abrajano & Hajnal, 2015; Collingwood et al. 2014). The Latino 
population in the United States has grown to nearly 61 million in 2019 (Noe-Bustamante, 
Lopez, and Krogstad 2019). Additionally, My findings clearly demonstrate that the IE 
model is still very much relevant for understanding the impact of racial appeals featuring 
Blacks, but that it does not travel to account for racist appeals that feature Latinos. 
 Chapter 4 is an extension to the foundational experiment presented in Chapter 
Three that introduces an original concept I call “tacit” appeals. Tacit appeals seek to 
increase the “implicitness” or subtlety of the rhetorical-visual construction of a racial 
appeal by encoding the racial content in images alone. Increasing the ambiguity of the 
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appeal helps assess whether respondents in the hyper-racialized contemporary political 
context are more sensitive to and aware of the meaning of traditionally coded implicit 
appeals that prime racial resentment with images and code words. This additional 
variation on racial appeal construction attempts to help arrive at a better understanding 
the priming mechanism that undergirds the psychology of implicit communication and 
whether acting on racial animus is a conscious or unconscious act. 
This chapter also seeks to understand how the social-psychological construction 
of political attitudes towards Blacks and Latinos as disparate racial group yields 
variations in ambivalence. Ambivalence, or the presence of conflicting racial attitudes, is 
a key feature of IE’s models theoretical foundation that produces a tension that can be 
exploited to mobilize white voters exposed to implicit, or ambiguous appeals. If the 
egalitarian norms that counterbalance the continued negative stereotyping of racial 
groups is underdeveloped for the Latino population in the United States, then there is no 
real motivation for candidates to embed their anti-Latino appeals in an implicit rhetorical 
construction; explicit appeals would not be strongly disavowed in a political context in 
which norms of Latino equality are not widely, or strongly held by voters. Additionally, I 
point to the ways that racial resentment can be conceptualized as a measure of individual 
level variation in the placement of one’s racial attitudes within the range of affective 
assessments available from the socio-political environment. As a result of a greater range 
of affective attitudes towards Blacks, there will likely be more variation in the responses 
to the anti-Black appeals compared to those featuring anti-Latino messages. 
 In Chapter 5, I perform a categorical examination of the ways in which 
partisanship conditions racial message reception. Here, I work to adjudicate between the 
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competing theoretical claims of the IE model and Partisan Motivated Reasoning, both of 
which purport a superseding adherence to a single affective commitment. For the IE 
model, adherence to the norm of racial equality is primary, whereas PMR suggests that 
affective party attachments supplant all other values or substantive positions in the 
expression of political opinions. My analyses demonstrate that in the “most racial” 
(Tessler 2016) contemporary political context, there is a deep partisan divide regarding 
the disavowal of explicit-Black appeals for both partisan voters and candidates. Explicit-
Black appeals made by Republican candidates are far more widely accepted by the 
electorate than when Democratic candidates make those same appeals. However, 
Democratic voters can be lured into acting on anti-Black affect when the appeals are very 
subtle (tacit) and delivered by a co-partisan candidate. Overall, the results disaggregated 
by partisanship further show that Democratic voters are the group within the electorate 
that is working to patrol and maintain the normative boundaries against explicitly racist 
appeals that feature Black Americans. 
 Finally, the Conclusion chapter of this dissertation will summarize the empirical 
findings of previous chapters and suggest ways that future research can support a deeper 
understanding of racial appeals across racial groups and political contexts. I also include 
some thoughts on the practical application of a bounded implicit-explicit model in 
contemporary politics.  
Overall, I find that the implicit-explicit model of racial priming is a useful 
paradigm through which we can understand racial appeals in contemporary politics and 
my work points to the ways in which its application to a particular racial group must first 
be qualified against the theory’s underlying assumptions. Partisan Motivated Reasoning 
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appears to be a stronger predictor of Republican political behavior than adherence to a 
norm of racial equality. Democrats are also motivated by partisan attachments in the face 
of nearly all racial appeals, but will strongly disavow explicit-Black appeals and punish 
the sponsoring candidate accordingly. As such, partisan polarization around issues of race 
and the maintenance of the norm of “African American” equality point to the ways in 
which the IE model continues to hold theoretical relevance for racially liberal Democrats, 
but loses predictive power among racially conservative, Republicans. Persistent 
Foreigner Positionality presently locates Latinos beyond an egalitarian racial norm 
without which the IE model cannot be appropriately applied to understanding negative 
racial appeals that feature the group. However, once that norm is established in the 
United States, the IE model should present useful theoretical predictions for Latinos just 








PERSISTENT FOREIGNER POSITIONALITY: UNDERSTANDING RACIAL 
PRIMING THEORY AND ITS (IN)APPLICABILITY TO APPEALS THAT 
NEGATIVELY FEATURE LATINOS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the two decades since the publication of The Race Card (Mendelberg 2001) the 
implicit-explicit (IE) model of racial priming has been paramount in helping political 
scientists and political pundits understand the form and impact of racial appeals. The IE 
model was developed in the wake of the Civil Rights movement with a Black-white 
understanding of racial dynamics. While the Black-white paradigm remains a significant 
lens for understanding and interpreting racial dynamics in the United States today (Carter 
2019), it may have limited utility in understanding whether and how theories developed 
to explain Black-white racial dynamics translate to account for those among whites and 
non-Black racial and ethnic groups. This study takes up the call for theorizing “beyond 
Black and white” (Segura and Rodrigues 2006) to comparatively assess the extent to 
which the IE model holds relevance when applied to racial appeals featuring Latinos. 
Major demographic shifts have increased the salience of other racial groups 
alongside Blacks in American politics. In particular, the Latino population surpassed 
sixty million in 2019 and has accounted for more than half (52%) of the United States’ 
population growth since 2010 (Noe-Bustamante, Lopez, and Krogstad 2020). This begs 
the question as to whether the IE model works to mobilize white political opinion when 
Latinos, or non-Black minority groups as opposed to Blacks are featured in negative 
racial campaign appeals? Given the particular dimensions of the social construction and 
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racialization of Blacks compared to Latinos, there is reason to believe that the norms 
governing racism, ethnocentrism, or nativism are distinct and not developed equally 
among the body politic of the United States. As a result, the political opinions and 
behaviors of white Americans may vary significantly, depending on the normative 
behaviors that are primed when different racial and ethnic groups are encountered in 
political media and campaign appeals. 
I develop a theory of Persistent Foreigner Positionality4 (PFP) to explain why 
Latinos (and other non-Black minorities) are not encompassed by the norm of racial 
equality and how, as a result, the normative constraints that would otherwise stem whites’ 
racialized thinking are not established for Latinos. My theory of PFP is a synthesis of 
Claire Jean Kim’s (1999) theory of racial triangulation and application to the IE model of 
racial priming. It takes the historical racial context of the civil rights movement into 
account and argues that Latinos are a poor fit for the model as a result. Persistent 
Foreigner Positionality highly resonates with Iris Marion Young’s argument that 
Hispanics/Latinos in the United States are “uniquely positioned as permanently foreign 
immigrants in the imagination of Anglo Americans” (2000, p. 159).  
In effect, the theory of Persistent Foreigner Positionality articulates they ways in 
which Latinos occupy a racial position that is distinct from Black Americans and explains 
 
4 My theory of Persistent Foreigner Positionality was developed independently from political theorist Iris 
Marion Young’s argument that Hispanics/Latinos in the United States are “uniquely positioned as 
permanently foreign immigrants in the imagination of Anglo Americans” (Young 2000, p. 159). While my 
theory of PFP shares many of the same tenets as Young’s argument, I came across her argument years 
after the development of my theory and research design. Also, I find it important to note that in earlier 
versions of this paper, I called my theory of PFP “Permanent Foreigner Positionality,” but changed it 
because I did not want my writing to reify the notion that Hispanics/Latinos must only occupy a 
“foreigner” positionality. Shifting the language to “persistent” creates possibilities for Hispanics/Latinos to 
occupy a more “insider” position within either the socio-political structure of the United States or in the 
“imagination” of white Americans. Finally, the novelty of my theory of PFP does not rest upon its 
theoretical construction so much as its application to the IE model of racial priming. 
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why the normative and psychological requisites of the IE model are not present when the 
theory of racial priming is applied to Latinos. By pointing out the present failure of fit of 
the IE model for Latinos, PFP also highlights the egalitarian normative conditions that 
must be created in order to make use of the model at some future moment. More 
importantly, PFP elucidates how establishing a norm of Latino equality is a key step that 
must be taken to advance the position of Latinos in the U.S. 
 
THE IE MODEL OF RACIAL PRIMING 
The implicit-explicit (IE) model of racial priming is articulated most fully by Tali 
Mendelberg in The Race Card (2001) where she argues that that race was still used in late 
20th century political advertisements, but unlike in pre-Civil Rights campaigns, these 
racial appeals were designed to subconsciously prime latent negative racial 
predispositions and do so in an implicit, rather than explicit, manner. This change in 
strategy employed by politicians reflects the ubiquity and power of the norm of racial 
equality in the U.S.; a norm that developed in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement. 
According to Mendelberg, the power of the norm of racial equality precludes 
contemporary politicians from using explicit racial appeals (those that contain racial 
nouns or adjectives) to express anti-Black sentiment in their campaign advertisements. 
Explicit appeals are viewed by large swaths of the American public as the product of a 
bygone era, and more importantly, are seen as violations of the norm of racial equality. 
Thus, explicit appeals became a precarious campaign tactic for political candidates. 
Despite this development, Mendelberg argues that race has not disappeared from 
campaign communications, but instead a rhetorical shift has occurred in which race is 
now communicated to voters using implicit messages. Implicit messages are appeals that 
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employ “code words” that are stereotypically associated with particular racial 
communities and are paired with visual depictions of the minority group targeted in the 
campaign ad.  
Due to the tension between egalitarian racial norms and the continued negative 
stereotyping of African Americans in the media, non-Hispanic, white Americans hold 
ambivalent racial sentiments regarding African Americans (Mendelberg 2001, p. 20). 
This tension can be exploited by politicians who choose strategic campaign messages that 
covertly activate anti-Black affect by reinforcing the salience of negative racial 
sentiments without seemingly violating the prevailing egalitarian racial norms. Thus, the 
effectiveness of an implicit appeal is a function of its ability to subconsciously prime 
negative racial predispositions. Mendelberg uncovers that implicit appeals had largely 
replaced explicit appeals in post-civil rights campaign advertisements, that implicit 
messages better primed racial resentment, and that exposure to implicit appeals led 
respondents to more strongly support restrictive welfare policies (see also, Hutchings et 
al. 2010; Valentino et al. 2002; White 2007). Implicit appeals that avoided the appearance 
of violating the norm of racial equality for African Americans successfully primed racial 
resentment and mobilize white voters’ support for the sponsoring candidate. To the 
contrary, explicit appeals were perceived as violating the racial norm of equality for 
African Americans. They were subsequently, disavowed by voters who rejected the 
message and “punished” the candidate sponsoring the ad by withdrawing their support.  
 Despite the primacy of the IE model, there are significant and emerging debates 
within the literature. Huber and Lapinski’s (2006) findings failed to replicate the 
disparate effects for implicit compared to explicit appeals with a nationally representative 
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sample. Instead, they found that racial resentment was the most powerful predictor for 
welfare policy support regardless of whether the policy appeal was made in an implicit or 
explicit manner. Huber and Lapinski (2006; 2008) argue that the unique priming effects 
of implicit appeals are exaggerated due to Mendelberg’s (2001) regionally specific 
sample and the absence of a race-neutral control condition in the survey design.  
 Mendelberg (2008a; 2008b) counters these claims by arguing that there are 
several methodological concerns with Huber and Lapinski’s (2006) experimental design. 
First, she questions whether there was “failure to treat” the respondents in the Huber and 
Lapinski study, given that not manipulation check was used to ensure that respondents 
received and understood the treatment conditions. Second, Mendelberg argues that racial 
schema would be called to mind across all conditions since racial attitudes were primed 
prior to treatment exposure, thereby moving all treatments to the same baseline. Lastly, 
Mendelberg notes that racial attitudes in the Huber and Lapinski study were measured 
with a 2-question battery that has been found to be less reliable than the standard 4-
question racial resentment scale. 
 More recently however, Valentino et al. (2017) suggest that the combination of an 
increase in white racial identity and safe partisan districts has contributed to a political 
environment in which candidates are no longer constrained in articulating explicitly racist 
rhetoric. Using a series of four, nationally representative samples, Valentino and 
colleagues introduce variation to their survey methods and measurements in order to give 
careful attention to the methodological debate that transpired between Mendelberg 
(2008a; 2008b) and Huber and Lapinki (2006; 2008). In the end, Valentino and 
colleagues find “strong circumstantial evidence that explicit racial rhetoric may no longer 
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be rejected by many Whites” (2017, p. 27). Their work calls attention to whether the 
relevancy of the IE model has expired completely or simply lost potency in the current 
political moment. 
Reny and colleagues’ (2019) study also fails to confirm the results expected of the 
IE model. However, they attribute their null results to an increased ability of voters to 
recognize the racial content of implicit appeal. These scholars argue that the historical 
shifts noted above have contributed to the hyper-racialized context in which political 
communication takes place. As a result, the racial content of an implicit appeal is just as 
easily perceived and salient as the racial content of an explicit appeal, for group-issue 
pairings that are highly congruent. Thus, the differential abilities of implicit and explicit 
racial appeals to mobilize racial attitudes are neutralized when they are perceived as 
interchangeable equivalents to one another. 
 The recent failures to confirm the outcomes anticipated by the IE model raise 
important questions about the model’s contemporary applicability to anti-Black and anti-
Latino campaign appeals. The empirical anomalies presented by these recent studies beg 
for a review of the model’s theoretical underpinnings. The new contextual terrain 
presented by contemporary politics calls into question the way that we understand the IE 
model and whether the constitution of its components has changed over time or has 
shifted in meaning and impact in relation to other political dynamics. While the IE model 
has been well theorized and empirically tested for anti-Black appeals, neither is true for 
anti-Latino appeals that seek to mobilize white voter opinion and turnout. Additionally, 
as the theoretical predictions of the IE model fail to be met, it is worth understanding the 
conditions and mediating factors that contribute to model’s success and limitations. 
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THE UNIQUE RACIALIZATION OF LATINOS 
Despite the many perceived similarities between African Americans and Latinos, 
Latinos are racialized in a manner distinct from Blacks in the United States context. A 
failure to recognize the racialized differences among minority groups may collapse 
important racial group distinctions into an oversimplified white-nonwhite dichotomy 
(Kim 1999) that provides little theoretical insights into the different racial attitudes that 
develop toward those groups and the contexts within which those attitudes may be 
exploited by political elites. Here, I advance a theory of Persistent Foreigner Positionality 
to explain how racial construction of Latinos leaves the group outside of the body politic 
and creates a limited social perception of the rights to which many are entitled as citizens. 
Claire Jean Kim’s (1999) theory of racial triangulation describes the ways in 
which minority groups are racialized relative to one another in the United States and thus 
occupy unique racial positions. According to Kim, racial triangulation takes place in a 
contextual field defined by two axes: a superior-inferior axis and an insider-foreigner 
axis. Through the narrative content of largely white opinionmakers such as political elites 
and the media, racial groups acquire ranked positions according to the dual processes of 
“relative valorization” and “civic ostracism” (see Figure 2.1). The groups’ racial 
positions set the normative benefits, opportunities, and constraints to which each group is 
entitled and ultimately works to reinforce the power and privilege of whites.  
The superior-inferior axis is defined by colorism with Blacks positioned at the 
bottom and whites toward the top. Following the civil rights movement however, this 
axis became “coded” in colorblind references to traditional American values such as 
work ethic, respect for the law, and family values. Using Asians Americans to articulate 
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her theory, Kim demonstrates that on the superior-inferior axis Asian Americans are 
“relatively valorized” to occupy a higher position as the “model minority” compared to 
African Americans. However, through a process of “civic ostracism” Asian Americans 
are constructed as “alien” outsiders who are not entitled to the full membership and 
benefits of incorporation into the American body politic. 
 
Figure 2.1: Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans 
 
 
From Kim (1999; p 108) “The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans.” 
 
When the theory of racial triangulation is applied to Latinos to highlight the ways 
in which the group is socially constructed to occupy a unique racialized position in the 
United States context. Latinos’ racial position creates a discrete set of normative 
interactions that determines the benefits and constraints that the group is subjected to and 
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that may be reinforced through stereotypes and discrimination. Positive stereotypes about 
Latinos being “hard working,” “family oriented,” and “religious” (Reny and Manzano 
2016) may help to elevate the group’s positionality vis-à-vis African Americans on the 
superior-inferior axis.  
However, processes of “civic ostracism” are used to essentialize Latinos as 
foreigners who cannot be assimilated into white culture. Civic ostracism, in the case of 
Latinos, can include legal barriers to naturalization (i.e. repeated failure to pass the 
DREAM Act), a hyperbolic notion of group members’ dual-loyalties to the United States 
and their Latin-American nations of origin, and consequently, the exaggerated perception 
of “threat” that the foreign language and cultural these “unassimilable aliens” pose to the 
identity of the United States (see for example Huntington 2009). This social construction 
of Latinos by mainstream media, nativist legislators, and white opinion leaders casts a 
persistent outsider status upon the group. Latinos’ position as “foreigners” along the 
insider-foreigner axis in the field of racial triangulation leaves Latinos without full 
membership into the American polity, thereby allowing white, non-Hispanic Americans 
to circumvent the normative rights and benefits afforded to “insiders.” 
This insider-outsider dimension presents an interesting and dynamic rendering of 
the U.S. racial order. As Blacks are typically positioned at the bottom of the superior-
inferior axis that is defined by white supremacy, Blacks have faced some of the most 
significant challenges and disadvantages in securing the material outcomes that could be 
used to advance their position. Latinos, stereotypically associated with Brown skin, 
would be located at a slightly higher position than Blacks on the colorism scale of this 
superior-inferior axis. However, Latinos’ exclusion from full membership in the U.S. 
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body politic as “outsiders” means that in some contexts, they may occupy a position that 
is effectively more disadvantaged than Blacks and have more limited access to 
advancement opportunities as a group. Additionally, colorism could impact an individual 
Latinos’ racial positionality given the significant racial variation among group members. 
According to racial positionality, Latinos with darker skin will accumulate multiple 
burdens and positional disadvantages, while those with lighter skin may be able to unload 
burdens as they “pass” for whites and gain access to venues which they would otherwise 
be excluded5. 
 
PERSISTENT FOREIGNER POSITIONALITY AND THE LIMITED UTILITY OF 
THE IE MODEL FOR LATINO APPEALS 
To date, the scholarship on racial priming theory has not yet adequately addressed 
whether the predictions of the implicit explicit model of racial priming explain how white 
respondents react to negative advertisements that feature Latinos (Sears and Savalei 
2003). It remains to be seen whether the IE model is bounded to the particular history and 
racialization of Blacks in the United States, or whether it can be applied more universally 
to other racial or ethnic minority groups. I argue that given the unique racialization of 
Latinos, along with the specificity of both the origins and definition of the norm of racial 
equality, it is unlikely that the associated predictions of the IE model extend to Latinos in 
the United States. 
As noted in the previous section, I am advancing a theory of Persistent Foreigner 
Positionality which asserts that Latinos are socially constructed in the United States as a 
 
5 Class could be an additional dimension that adds to the dynamic racial positionality of individual group 
members, where wealth can have a “lightening” effect along the superior-inferior axis. 
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pan-ethnic racial group that is cast en mass as “foreigners” with no legitimate claim to the 
political rights and social benefits of citizens, regardless of their individual citizenship 
status. The unique processes of racialization involved in the group’s social construction 
likewise position Latinos beyond the normative rights afforded to citizens and leave them 
vulnerable to rhetorical attacks and unfair treatment. As a result, I hypothesize that these 
distinct processes of racialization have significant theoretical and applied implications for 
how we identify and understand the incidence and impact of negative campaign 
advertisements with racial appeals targeting Latinos. 
Additionally, I argue that the egalitarian racial norms that developed in the wake 
of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States do not extend beyond African 
Americans to encompass Latinos given the specific historical and racial context in which 
the norm was developed. In the absence of nationally salient landmark legislation, critical 
judicial rulings and sociocultural signals that would undergird the applicability of 
egalitarian norms to Latinos, it puts into question whether the “norm of racial equality” 
has been conflated with what may be more appropriately named a “norm of African 
American equality.” Without an egalitarian norm that extends to include Latinos, there is 
no countervailing force to stem white opinion and behavior in the face of racialized, anti-
Latino rhetoric and messaging. 
Therefore, there are two distinct phenomena by which Latinos may be excluded 
from the racial norm of equality in the United States. Latinos are either excluded from the 
norm of racial equality because the norm that developed in the wake of the civil rights 
movement did not fully extend beyond Blacks to other racial(ized) groups. Or, Latinos 
are excluded from the norm of racial equality because they are racialized with a 
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“foreigner” positionality that limits or eliminates their claims the rights and benefits 
afforded to citizens (regardless of individual citizenship status). In my theory of PFP I am 
agnostic about which of the two is responsible for Latinos’ exclusion from the norm, or 
whether both phenomena play a part. What is at the core of my theory of Persistent 
Foreigner Positionality is simply that Latinos are racialized to occupy a racial position 
distinct from Blacks, and that position is not tethered to a norm of racial (Latino) equality 
that would serve as a countervailing force on anti-Latino opinions and behaviors. As 
such, it is ineffectual to apply the implicit-explicit model of racial priming to any group 
for which a norm of equality does not exist. 
 
The Ambivalence and Ambiguity Axioms 
The success of implicit racial communication depends on four theoretical axioms: 
Ambivalence, Accessibility, Ambiguity, Awareness (Mendelberg 2001, Chapter Four). 
Ambivalence refers to the presence of conflicting racial attitudes. For ambivalence to be 
present, a racial schema must be composed of both positive and negative racial affects 
that are relatively in balance with one another. Accessibility is the ease with which racial 
predispositions are brought to bear on political decisions, either latent or primed. 
Awareness, refer to the conscious or unconscious position of a primed racial schema in 
the mind of the message recipient. Finally, Ambiguity is the quality of plausible 
deniability of the racial content embedded in an appeal. While Accessibility and 
Awareness are features of individual cognition, the remaining axioms are established 
through an interaction of individual cognition with the contextual information 
environment (Ambivalence) and the message form and content (Ambiguity). I will focus 
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on these interactive axioms to demonstrate the gaps in translating the IE model to Latino 
targets. 
Ambivalent racial attitudes are fundamental to the proper functioning of the IE 
model. Egalitarian racial norms concomitantly running alongside negative racial 
stereotyping create a condition in which negative racial appeals will be accepted so long 
as they avoid an appearance of violating racial norms. When racial appeals explicitly 
violate egalitarian racial norms, the appeal will be rejected and reduce favorability toward 
message sponsor. If Latinos are socially constructed outside the bounds and benefits of 
egalitarian racial norms, then political rhetoric will be untethered to social desirability 
biases. The effect is that Latinos open to explicitly negative rhetorical attacks. In the 
absence of ambivalent racial attitudes regarding Latinos it may be easier for both 
candidates and white, non-Hispanic voters to outwardly express racial resentment toward 
the group without fear of social repercussions.  
Additionally, the success of implicit appeals vis-à-vis the failure of explicit 
appeals is contingent upon message ambiguity within an environment in which 
egalitarian norms are present. The racial content must go undetected, or at least retain a 
degree of plausible deniability, for the appeal to prime racialized thinking that goes 
unattended and then subsequently expressed. However, if the egalitarian norms that stem 
racialized thinking are not sufficiently robust, elites do not have to rely on a set of “code 
words” within which anti-Latino sentiments must be couched. The need for ambiguity is 
thus reduced, allowing elite communication with white, non-Hispanic audiences to take 
on more explicitly negative and racial forms when featuring Latinos.  
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Therefore, the axioms upon which the implicit explicit model rests begin to 
quickly unfurl when the unique racialization and Persistent Foreigner Positionality of 
Latinos are taken into consideration. Whether the norm of racial equality is indeed merely 
a norm of African American equality, or Latinos are independently constructed as a 
social group with no claim to the egalitarian norms or rights of citizens, there is no 
countervailing force for the negative stereotyping and discrimination directed toward 
Latinos in the contemporary U.S. political communications. The implication is that there 
is neither normative pressure to conceal anti-Latino racist rhetoric, nor to disavow such 




MAIN EFFECTS: COMPARING IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT APPEALS FOR BLACK 
AND LATINO CAMPAIGN AD TARGETS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter concerns the research questions that are most central to the current 
racial priming debate. The first question is whether Tali Mendelberg’s Implicit-Explicit 
model (2001) continues to have relevance for negative campaign appeals featuring 
African Americans. The second, is whether the model extends to account for the impact 
of anti-Latino campaign appeals on white voters.  I employ a survey experiment designed 
to directly and comparatively assess the impacts of anti-Black and anti-Latino campaign 
appeals on candidate favorability. The comparative design allows me to 1) adjudicate 
between Mendelberg’s (2001) IE model and the recent priming literature that fails to 
replicate the model in the contemporary political context (for anti-Black appeals) and 2) 
adjudicate between Mendelberg (2001) and my own theory of Persistent Foreigner 
Positionality (PFP, for anti-Latino appeals). 
This direct examination of the impact of racial campaign communications (rather 
than the elite opinions on racial appeals to white voters) is an important contribution to 
the racial priming literature for several reasons. Most importantly, my study re-centers 
the literature on the impact of implicit-explicit racial campaign appeals on white voter 
political opinion and behavior. Over time, the focus of racial priming studies has drifted 
away from examining the impact of the form and content of racialized campaign ads on 
white voters’ political decisions. Instead, racial priming inquiries have taken up an 
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examination of elite-mass communications that identify and interpret the racial content of 
campaign messages. In other words, these studies are no longer focused on the impact of 
implicit and explicit racial appeals on voters’ political preferences but are instead 
interested in how elite opinions on racial campaign appeals impact voter preferences. For 
example, several studies have taken up the question of whether revealing the racial 
content of an implicit appeal is an effective counterstrategy in undermining the power of 
racial primes (Nteta et al. 2016; Tokeshi and Mendelberg 2016). Other studies have 
investigated the abilities of implicit and explicit media reports to prime racial resentment 
and mobilize white electoral support (Reny et al. 2019; Valentino et al. 2018). Elite 
counterstrategies for “rendering the implicit explicit” is an important aspect of the racial 
priming theory Mendelberg explores in The Race Card (2001), however it is not central 
to the IE model in and of itself. If we are to be serious about understanding the impact of 
racial appeals on white voter preferences then it is to focus on the campaign appeals 
themselves, rather than just the elite interpretations of those appeals. This present study 
returns the inquiry into implicit-explicit appeals back to its roots in order to assess the 
model’s contemporary relevance. 
Second, the application of the IE model to campaign ads featuring Latino or other 
minority groups in the United States is an emerging, yet still underexplored area within 
racial priming theory (though see Junn and Masuoka 2013; Hopkins and Ostfeld 2016; 
Reny et al. 2019). The Race Card (Mendelberg 2001) and subsequent racial priming 
studies have been almost exclusively on anti-Black appeals and, consequently, not kept 
pace with the country’s changing demographics. Latinos have supplanted the African 
American population as this country’s largest minority group (US Census 2010) and the 
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political salience of the Latino population in the United States has grown since 
Mendelberg’s writing (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Collingwood, Barreto, and Garcia-
Rios 2014). Starting in the late 1990’s, anecdotal evidence suggests that candidates for 
elected office have increasingly used Latino targets in campaign appeals aimed at 
mobilizing white voter support. As different minority groups are racialized in ways that 
are distinct from, and in relation to, one another (Kim 1999), it would be false to assume 
that all non-Black minority groups fit into a model that was used to describe anti-Black 
racial rhetoric. In particular, it is not clear that the requisite conditions of the IE model are 
met when the rhetorical targets of campaign appeals are Latino or other non-Black 
minorities. My study contributes to a longstanding lacuna in the literature on non-Black 
racial priming and racial appeals. 
 
ANTI-BLACK APPEALS, THE IE MODEL, AND FAILURES TO REPLICATE 
As I noted in Chapter Two, recent research suggests that contemporary U.S. 
politics has reached the limits of racial priming theory because implicit and explicit 
appeals are no longer distinguished by voters or lead to disparate outcomes. This research 
suggests that a pair of historical shifts have occurred that have rendered the IE Model 
obsolete in the United States’ contemporary political communications environment. 
These shifts include a secular partisan realignment (Tesler 2016) and increased 
perceptions of whites as a racial group that is under threat (Jardina 2014). For Valentino 
et al. (2018) these shifts have resulted in an increased tolerance of explicitly anti-Black 
appeals among white voters. Valentino and colleagues claim that anti-Black appeals are 
no longer strongly disavowed by large swaths of white Americans due to the combination 
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of the historical shifts noted above. White perceptions of racial group threat boost the 
acceptability of explicit expressions discrimination and prejudice (Effron and Knowles 
2015). This secular, partisan realignment has resulted in safe Republican districts that 
have shifted the vote calculus more favorably toward candidates who wish to use racial 
messages as a campaign tactic.  
Reny and colleagues (2019) attribute these null differences between implicit and 
explicit appeals to an increased ability of voters to recognize the racial content of implicit 
appeal. These scholars argue that the historical shifts noted above have contributed to the 
hyper-racialized context in which political communication takes place. As a result, the 
racial content of an implicit appeal is just as easily perceived and salient as the racial 
content of an explicit appeal, for group-issue pairings that are highly congruent. Thus, the 
different abilities of implicit and explicit racial to mobilize racial attitudes are neutralized 
as they are read as interchangeable equivalents to one another. 
It is interesting that although the Valentino et al. (2018) and Reny et al. (2019) 
share the same theoretical foundations regarding the historical shifts that are 
underpinning the failure of the IE model, the theoretical implications of their studies 
move in opposite directions. On the one hand, if Valentino and colleagues argue that 
explicit appeals are no longer disavowed by white voters, then we should see both 
implicit and explicit appeals successfully mobilize candidate support. On the other hand, 
if Reny and colleagues assert that the racial content of implicit appeals is more easily 
recognized, then implicit appeals should be treated as if they were explicit appeals and 
disavowed along with the explicit appeals. The theoretical implications contradict one 
another; both cannot be expressions of the same theoretical claims. While both the Reny 
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and Valentino studies find null differences between the implicit and explicit versions of 
their anti-Black campaign appeals, it is not enough to evaluate the ability of implicit vis-
à-vis explicit messages to prime racial considerations and mobilize white voter political 
preferences. There are distinct hypotheses for the direction of the impact of implicit and 
explicit appeals and we should evaluate each of them independently. 
In fact, the null findings of the Reny et al. (2019) study conceal an equally 
interesting, albeit overlooked result: exposure to implicit and explicit appeals generated 
positive respondent support ratings for their fictional candidate. This is counter to what 
the IE Model would anticipate for a campaign appeal whose racial content is apparent—
that explicitly racial ads, or ads whose racial content is understood, should be disavowed 
by white voters who then withdraw their support from the sponsoring candidate. 
Alternatively, explicit appeals in the Valentino et al study (2018) mobilize respondent 
support for healthcare policy and political leaders as the IE model predicts for implicit 
appeals. Though this finding is theoretically congruous with the IE model hypotheses, it 
is a violation of the psychological mechanisms involved in racial priming and activating 
adherence to the norm of African American equality. The authors suggest that the 
aforementioned historical shifts have altered the norms of racial discourse that govern 
contemporary political campaigns. 
 
Hypotheses 
Is this true? Is the norm of African American equality waning in the 
contemporary political landscape? Or, are the null findings of the recent literature an 
artifact of negative elite opinions leading respondents to feel negatively about African 
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American ad targets regardless of the form of the racial appeal? If the IE model continues 
to have relevance for campaign appeals that negatively target African Americans, then 
we should see voters disavow those messages and distance themselves from the 
sponsoring candidate. We would then predict that explicit-Black appeals reduce candidate 
favorability ratings relative to the nonracial control (H1a). Likewise, the ambiguity of 
implicit appeals in combination with ambivalent racial attitudes that maintain the value of 
African American equality, alongside continued negative Black stereotyping, would 
mean that implicit appeals continue to powerfully mobilize the preferences of white 
voters. In keeping with the IE model, we would predict that implicit-Black appeals 
increase candidate favorability ratings relative to the nonracial control (H1b).  
 
ANTI-LATINO APPEALS, THE IE MODEL, AND PERSISTENT FOREIGNER 
POSITIONALITY 
We can only understand the extent to which the IE model applies to Latino 
appeals in contemporary political context. It is difficult to claim that there has been 
movement in a particular direction when it has not previously been measured. Without a 
prior baseline we cannot state either that America’s tolerance of explicit racial appeals or 
that recognition of implicit appeals has grown for Latino and other non-Black minority 
groups. There are a limited number of published works that explore non-Black racial 
appeals. For those studies that have featured Latino groups, the focus was not the 
application and extension of the IE model to Latino appeals. Instead, these authors focus 
on how racial group membership in the United States mediates the reception of racialized 
messages (Masuoka and Junn 2016) or how racial cues mediate immigration attitudes 
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specifically (Brader, Valentino, Suhay 2008, see also unpublished manuscript by Hopkins 
and Ostfeld 2016). Yet, anecdotal evidence points clearly to an increase in the use of 
negative Latino appeals as a campaign strategy which merits scholarly inquiry. 
Newer work by Reny and colleagues (2019) takes on the question of whether 
implicit and explicit anti-Latino appeals follow the same predictions that the IE model 
holds for African American appeals. Their research found no distinction between implicit 
and explicit appeals for highly congruous issue-group pairings. Meaning, for issue-group 
pairings that are highly salient due to their frequent coupling in the media, respondents 
can read into the racial content of an implicit appeal. As a result, the explicit and implicit 
in their study appeals have the same impact on respondents.  
However, the Reny et al. (2019) study has two methodological weaknesses in its 
research design. To start with, the design suffers from the same methodological concerns 
I noted above regarding the overall slippage in the literature away from directly testing 
the impact of campaign appeals. Instead, Reny et al.’s (2019) examines the impact of 
elite opinions of the racial content. The experimental design employed uses an implicit 
storyboard appeal for three issue-group pairings, followed by either an implicit or explicit 
opinion editorial regarding the content of the ad. Therefore, the implicit and explicit 
manipulations are encased in the opinion editorials that follow the exposure to the various 
racially implicit campaign ads, as opposed to the campaign ads themselves. While this is 
an appropriate design for studying how elite opinions might mediate the reception of 
racial content—and subsequent political decisions—it does not, however, fundamentally 
examine how an implicit or explicit racial campaign ad impacts white vote choice or 
candidate favorability. 
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Additionally, utilizing the term “illegal aliens” as the referent code word in an 
implicit-Latino group treatment on immigration is problematic as it places the target 
group outside of the United States’ body politic. The rhetorical placement of Latinos 
outside the body politic renders the group undeserving of political benefits and 
protections. Previous research has noted the ways in which the social construction of the 
term, “illegal alien,” has been both racialized as non-white and criminalized by the 
United States’ “color-blind” immigration policies (Masuoka and Junn 2016; Perez 2010). 
The modifier implies that there is a legitimate reason to withhold the political rights and 
social benefits to which many Latinos would otherwise be entitled. As a result, it creates 
a socially acceptable and race-neutral context for discussing immigration violations and 
justifying social policy restrictions (Masuoka and Junn 2016; Ono and Sloop 2002; Santa 
Ana 1999). Furthermore, the use of the word “alien” is associated with concepts such as 
“enemy invaders” or “harmful outsiders,” the type of phrases used to describe groups that 
have been perceived to resist American assimilation or those who pose a threat to 
American identity and way of life (Flores 2003; Nuñez 2013). Even if a norm of racial 
equality should exist for individuals of Latino origin, it does not hold that said norm 
would extend to “illegal aliens” because that term casts the group as outsiders and 
rationalizes the denial of benefits and protections to the group due to their “foreigner” 
positionality. Therefore, the rhetorical construction of “illegal alien” for an implicit-
Latino appeal does not satisfy the necessary prerequisites of the IE model—principally 
that a norm of equality is present and that the message recipients hold ambivalent 
attitudes toward the target group. The use of the term, “illegal alien” thereby greatly 
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diminishes any chance of observing manipulation effects that would be associated with 
an implicit appeal. 
Recall from Chapter Two that while the African American norm of racial equality 
has long been substantiated by a host of national legislative reforms and survey data that 
demonstrates a wide rejection of biological inferiority (Kinder and Sanders 1996), 
Persistent Foreigner Positionality questions whether the norm of racial equality extends 
beyond African Americans. PFP asserts that the political and academic focus on the 
Black-white paradigm for understanding race relations in the US has inadvertently 
conflated African American equality with (all) “racial” equality.  To isolate whether 
egalitarian norms extend to Latino people—and by extension whether the IE model can 
be applied to Latino racial appeals—the research design must make a best effort to place 
the target group within the United States’ body politic. In doing so, the group is 
positioned as reasonably deserving of political inclusion eligible for egalitarian treatment 
should such norms exist. 
 
Hypotheses. 
If the norm of racial equality subsumes Latino groups within its umbrella, then the 
IE model should account for the differential impact of implicit and explicit Latino 
appeals on white voters. This model would predict that anti-Latino appeals both play out 
in the same ways that they would for anti-Black appeals (H3.1a,b): explicit Latino 
appeals reduce candidate favorability ratings relative to the control (H3.2a), while 
implicit Latino appeals increase candidate favorability ratings relative to the control 
(H3.2b). However, if the norm of racial equality does not extend to include Latino 
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members of the American polity, then the theory of Persistent Foreigner Positionality 
would be better able to account for the responses of white voters who are exposed to anti-
Latino campaign appeals. Absent a norm of racial equality, explicit racial rhetoric could 
effectively prime racialized thinking and circumvent respondent adherence to values of 
racial egalitarianism. In turn, without the constraint of a potential norm violation, 
explicit-Latino appeals would successfully mobilize candidate support in the same way as 
implicit Latino appeals. Following this logic, I predict that explicit Latino appeals would 
increase candidate favorability ratings relative to the control (H3.3a) and that explicit 
Latino appeals are not less effective than implicit Latino appeals at increasing candidate 




The experimental design I employ provides a direct assessment of the differential 
impacts of implicit and explicit, anti-Black & anti-Latino appeals on white respondents’ 
political evaluations. The foundation survey experiment6 takes on the form of a 2 x 2 
comparative design: racial group (Black or Latino) and racial appeal (explicit or implicit), 
alongside a control that had no racial image or racial rhetoric. All respondents viewed a 
series of two campaign mailer images that were sponsored by a fictitious Congressman, 
“Don Williams.” The first was an “Election Day” mailer (Figure 3.1) and the second was 
a “Voter ID” issue mailer (Table 3.1) which contained the treatment manipulations 
(control, Black-explicit, Black-implicit, Latino explicit, and Latino-implicit).  
 
6 The full survey experiment included two other conditions: Black-tacit and Latino-tacit conditions which 
included the racial image of voters at the polls (Black and Latino voters, respectively) along with the race-
neutral rhetoric employed in the control. I introduce these conditions in Chapter Four. 
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I took several measures to ensure that respondents’ experience of the campaign 
mailers contained a high degree of external validity. Multiple mailers were employed in 
the treatment conditions in order to avoid the treatment manipulations appearing too blunt 
(Hersh and Schaffner 2013). I contracted a professional graphic designer with extensive 
experience in electoral campaigns to design each mailer. Taken together, these measures 
created the illusion of a real-world candidate with real campaign materials for 
respondents to consider and respond to directly. This is an important feature to highlight; 
many studies in the racial priming literature have taken a turn in their methodology and 
now measure the impact of elite opinions of a racial appeal (Valentino et al. 2018; Reny 
et al. 2019), as opposed to the impact of the racial campaign ad itself. 
In order to control for partisanship effects, the partisan affiliation of Congressman 
Williams was randomized in each of the five conditions by showing respondents a 
preamble to the mailer image series that read,  
“On the next page, you will see some campaign materials from Democratic 
[Republican] Congressman, Don Williams, that will be followed by a short set of 
questions. Please take your time to look over each of the campaign mailers 
carefully.7”  
 
All respondents in the survey module began the experiment with the preamble message. 
Then, all respondents viewed the same “Election Day” mailer (Figure 3.1) and were then 
randomly exposed to one of five “Voter ID” mailer conditions: control, Black-explicit, 
Black-implicit, Latino-explicit, or Latino-implicit (Table 3.1), followed by a post-
treatment questionnaire. 
The “Election Day” mailer provided the candidate’s name, district information 
(also fictitious), the date of the upcoming election, and included a photo of Congressman 
 
7 The co-partisan and cross-partisan effects of implicit-explicit elite messaging is taken up in Chapter Five. 
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Williams standing in front of a blurred Capitol Hill in the background (Figure 3.1). The 
“Voter ID” issue mailer, which showcased the candidate’s support for restrictive voter 
identification laws, housed the treatment manipulations which varied among racial targets 
(images of Black or Latino voters) and racial message content (explicit or implicit, see 
Table 3.1).  
 




The “Voter ID” issue mailers showed an image of the Capitol Building with an 
American flag in the foreground overlaid with a text banner on top that read, “VOTER ID 
PREVENTS FRAUD”, along with another, smaller text banner in the middle of the mailer 
that read, “Congressman Williams supports Voter ID laws.” The visual and rhetorical 
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manipulations were overlaid in the area between these two text banners. An image of 
members of the target racial group (Black or Latino) voting at an election polling location 
was placed on the left between the text banners and a text box with a racial narrative 
(implicit or explicit) was placed to the right. The racial narrative was matched to the race 
of the voters at the polls’ image and was a variant of the following message: “Thousands 
of [people] are registered to vote in multiple states, violating our election laws.” The 
word “people” was altered according to the various conditions. 
 
Figure 3.2: Mailer 2, Voter ID Issue Mailer- Control 
 
 
The control condition (Figure 3.2) utilized the race-neutral message above where 
the appeal targets are referred to only as “people” and did not include any image of voters 
at the polls (instead, the Capitol Building was in full view). All of the treatment 
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conditions are visually and rhetorically identical to the control, except that the image of 
the featured racial group, and the racial rhetoric describing the featured racial group had 
been systematically altered. In keeping with the standard definition of implicit and 
explicit racial appeal, (Mendelberg, 2001; Hutchings et al., 2010; Valentino et al., 2002; 
White, 2007) the two explicit treatments in my survey experiment (Black-explicit and 
Latino-explicit) contained a racial narrative that used the racial nouns “Blacks” and 
“Latinos” to identify the target group directly: “Thousands of Blacks [“Latinos”] are 
registered to vote in multiple states, violating our election laws.” The two implicit 
appeals used the code words “criminals” (Black-implicit) or “immigrants” (Latino-
implicit) to identify the target population: “Thousands of criminals [immigrants] are 
registered to vote in multiple states, violating our election laws.” 
Careful consideration was given to the language used for the code words used in 
the implicit appeals. I specifically avoided using the terms “illegal immigrant” or “illegal 
alien” in describing Latinos in order to maximize the probability that respondents could 
conceptualize the group as a part of the American polity. As I previously noted, the 
modifier “illegal” has been used as a rhetorical justification for circumventing egalitarian 
racial norms and in applying negative evaluations to Latinos, in particular (Cardona-
Arroyo, 2017; Pérez, 2016; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Likewise, the term “alien” brings 
up imagery of “threatening outsiders,” placing the group outside of the US body politic. 
The language within which the implicit-Latino appeal is encoded is an important 
consideration given the theoretical assumptions about the norm of racial equality 
embedded in both the IE model and my theory of Persistent Foreigner Positionality. One 
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could only reasonably expect egalitarian racial norms to extend to individuals perceived 
to be legitimate (legal) members of the polity. 
 
Table 3.1: Foundation Experiment Conditions 
 
Full sized images of all treatment conditions can be found in Appendix B. 
 
I selected group-issue pairings in which the code words employed would bring to 
mind appropriate group-based considerations while still providing the rhetorical 
ambiguity, and plausible deniability, required of an implicit appeal (Mendelberg, 2001). 
Media portrayals of Blacks disproportionately associated with issues of welfare, crime 
(Gilens 1999; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; Peffley et al. 1997), 
and for Latinos immigration (Santa Ana 2002; Valentino et al. 2013), respectively. 
Therefore, “criminals” (for Blacks) and “immigrants” (for Latinos) were chosen to 
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represent the racial groups in the implicit conditions. Literary corpus research has shown 
that the term “immigrant” carries with it far more positive connotations such as ‘family’ 
and ‘vulnerability’ than the term “alien” (Nunez 2013). While “immigrant” is certainly 
conceptualized as a group of “others”—who do not enjoy the full rights and benefits 
afforded to “citizens”—it carries with it far more humanistic considerations than “alien.” 
The word “immigrant” also forms a neat parallel to the use of the word “criminal” that 
has been used extensively in the IE literature to refer to Blacks in implicit treatment 
manipulations as these groups both may not enjoy their full rights of citizenship at times.  
Likewise, there are many advantages in the selection of voter identification laws 
as the issue domain in which the experimental manipulations were embedded. First, using 
voter ID laws is a novel approach to studying racial appeals (Wilson and Brewer, 2013). 
It moves the racial priming research away from highly charged issues such as welfare and 
crime (for Blacks) or immigration (for Latinos) that are stereotypically associated with 
these particular racial/racialized groups. Respondents have been shown to “fill in the 
gaps” for implicit messages with highly congruent issue-group pairings (Reny et al. 
2019). For these implicit appeals, respondents understand the racial content, processing  
the information consciously rather than unconsciously (as the IE model would require of 
a successful implicit appeal). Endogenous priming effects may result from highly 
congruous issue-group pairings in which it is unclear if the target group or the issue in the 
appeal is responsible for any observed treatment effects. Voter identification laws are 
proposed as ostensible efforts to curb voter fraud perpetrated by ineligible voters such as 
felons or non-citizens (Minnite 2007). Thus, the issue is salient across both target groups 
in my study without being overly congruous at the time the study was conducted.  
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A second advantage is that voter identification laws is a social policy that has a 
high degree of contemporary relevance. This evidenced by the recent surge in the number 
of states pursuing or enacting voter identification laws (Bentele and O’Brien 2013). 
Proposals that require voters to produce some form of identification before being allowed 
to vote have consistently drawn overwhelming public support in opinion surveys, even 
among Democrats and minorities (Pew Research Center, 2012; Rasmussen Reports 2015; 
The Washington Post, 2012). From this we can infer that the issue enjoys a degree of bi-
partisan support among the mass public. 
Finally, there is a high likelihood of observing manipulation effects within this 
issue area. Voter identification laws appear, on the surface, to be nonracial appeals for 
maintaining the integrity of our elections system by limiting opportunities for fraud. 
Campaign messages in support for voter identification laws are presented in a race-
neutral manner and typically do not use racial imagery or racialized code words. Yet, 
recent research has found that racial imagery can sway support for voter identification 
laws among racially resentful respondents (Wilson et al., 2014) and that the proposal and 
passage of state-level legislation is responsive to the state’s racial composition (Bentele 
and O’Brien 2013). The race-neutral presentation of voter ID laws, along with evidence 




The data in this study come from questions I designed for a module in the 2016 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). The CCES is an online survey of 
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over 64,000 American adults conducted via YouGov.com on behalf of over 50 colleges 
and universities. This collaborative study has been shown to produce estimates similar to 
telephone and mail surveys (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2014).  It gathers a nationally 
representative sample of “opt-in” volunteer respondents from the YouGov database.  The 
2016 CCES was fielded in two panels during September and October 2016 (pre-election) 
and in November 2016 (post-election). The total number of non-Hispanic, white adult 
respondents available to my module was 1,973. It was important to exclude white 
Hispanics from my sample because they may identify with the Latino targets in the 
survey experiment campaign ads and produce responses that differ from non-Hispanic, 
white respondents. 
The dual wave panel allowed me to ask questions about racial resentment in such 
a way that pre-treatment priming effects, as well as any post-treatment conditioning 
effects, could both be avoided. Prior research suggests that asking racial resentment 
questions shortly in advance of the experimental treatments may prime racial 
considerations across all treatments and produce null results (Mendelberg, 2008). The 
pre-treatment questionnaire was administered six weeks prior to being exposed to the 
treatments. The pre-election survey to collect demographic data along with measures of 
respondent party identification (7-point scale, strong Democrat to strong Republican, 
includes leaners) and racial resentment (ANES 4-question battery). In the post-election 
survey, respondents were randomly exposed to the series of campaign mailer treatments 
sponsored by the fictitious Congressman Don Williams, followed by a post-treatment 
questionnaire. The post-treatment questionnaire included questions on attention to the 
treatment, candidate favorability, vote choice, Black and Latino racial resentment, 
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support for restrictive Black and Latino social policy questions (full question wording for 
each can be found in the Appendix). For this chapter, candidate favorability is the 
dependent variable of interest:8 “How favorable do you feel towards the candidate?” 
measured with a feeling thermometer that ranged from 0-100 (strongly oppose to strongly 
favor). Candidate favorability replicates the claims of Mendelberg’s (2001) study on the 




In testing the hypotheses outlined above, I first estimated a regression model that 
examined the impact of implicit, and explicit, Black and Latino appeals relative to the 
control condition.  A plot of the treatment effect coefficients and 95% confidence 
intervals relative to the control for this model can be seen in Figure 3.3. There are several 
noteworthy findings here. First, there is a strong confirmation of the explicit appeal 
hypothesis (H3.1a) that is at the core of Mendelberg’s IE model. The explicit-Black 
appeal has a negative impact on candidate favorability (-9 points, p < .001) relative to the 
race-neutral appeal in the control. Explicit-Black appeals perform as the IE model would 
expect; appeals were largely disavowed by white respondents and we saw a 
corresponding drop in candidate favorability relative to the control. 
Next, the implicit-Black appeals did not elicit the positive candidate evaluations 
relative to the control that I expected from the IE model (H3.1b). The result here is not 
 
8 Vote choice was also asked: “If you lived in Congressman Williams' district, how likely would you be to 
vote for him?” measured with a 5-point Likert scale (extremely likely to extremely unlikely). The results 
replicated those for candidate favorability (see Appendix for full regression analysis). Presenting the results 
to the favorability question was preferred mainly because the response measurement allowed for a greater 
range of variation to make use of in an OLS regression model. 
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statistically significant (p =.485) relative to the control. The 7-point drop in favorability 
for respondents exposed to the explicit rather than the implicit appeal is highly significant 
(p =.009), according to a two-tailed test of significance. According to Mendelberg (2001), 
implicit appeals are better at priming racial thinking and mobilizing white voters than 
explicit appeals. There is inconclusive support then for the implicit Black-appeal 
hypothesis (H3.1b). White voters punish a candidate more harshly for making an explicit-
Black appeal, but the results point only to that benefit as a result of the depressed support 
among respondents exposed to the explicit-Black appeal. The results for implicit-Black 
appeals do not provide evidence of candidate favorability being mobilized by that appeal. 
 






When turning attention to the explicit-Latino appeal, I find results contrary to the 
expectations of the IE model (H3.2a) and show tepid support my own theory of Persistent 
Foreigner Positionality (H3.3a). Explicit-Latino appeals generate a marginally significant 
positive increase in candidate favorability (5 points, p=.055) among white voters relative 
to the control. White voters exposed to an explicit-Latino appeal reward the candidate 
with slightly improved favorability ratings, rather than withdrawing their support as they 
would for an explicit-Black appeal. Altogether, there is a 14-point benefit in favorability 
ratings when the candidate uses explicit racial appeals that target Latinos compared to 
explicit appeals that target Blacks. A t-test shows that this increase in candidate 
favorability is associated with a very high degree of significance (p<.001). The positive 
coefficient and marginally significant effect of the explicit Latino treatment runs counter 
to the expectations of the IE model of racial priming. Explicitly racial ads that feature 
Latinos appear to be successful at mobilizing white voter support. and can suggest that 
the norm of racial equality, or at least the pressure to conform to such, does not extend to 
Latino appeals.  
Finally, implicit-Latino appeals are not significant relative to the control (p=.123). 
A two-tailed t-test demonstrates that the responses to explicit- and implicit-Latino 
appeals have nearly identical means and their difference does not achieve statistical 
significance (diff =.84, p =.744). This null finding does not provide much insight into 







 This chapter presented a direct experimental test of Mendelberg’s (2001) IE 
model for contemporary anti-Black and anti-Latino appeals. I find partial support for the 
IE Model with regards to anti-Black appeals. Specifically, the respondents exposed to 
explicit, anti-Black appeals were significantly more likely to withdraw their electoral 
support from the candidate sponsoring the message. The fact that I find significant 
negative candidate favorability effects for explicit-Black appeals indicates that they 
continue to be disavowed by large swaths of white voters in contemporary US politics. 
 The effects for implicit-Black appeals fail to reach standard levels of statistical 
significance. Although the implicit-Black appeal generates higher favorability ratings 
relative to the explicit-Black appeal, the results suggest that that benefit is produced 
solely by depressed favorability ratings among respondents in the explicit-Black 
condition. There is no mobilizing effect observed for the implicit-Black condition as 
would be anticipated by the IE model. The control condition creates a baseline effect that 
is useful in helping to decipher the source of the relative benefit of the implicit appeal 
compared to the explicit appeal.  
 When we turn our attention to the Latino treatments, Mendelberg’s hypotheses 
did not play out as expected. Had the IE model worked for the explicit, anti-Latino 
appeals, the results would show a decrease in candidate favorability relative to the race-
neutral control. Instead, I found a marginally significant, positive candidate favorability 
effects among respondents exposed to an explicit-Latino appeal. Though modest, these 
results support for my theory of Persistent Foreigner Positionality which states that the 
norm of racial equality does not encompass the Latino population in the United States 
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and that a norm of Latino equality has not been fully crystalized. Without a norm of 
equality that includes the Latino population, candidates are not precluded from making 
and befitting from anti-Latino appeals.  
The IE model of racial priming states that implicit appeals are successful because 
their ambiguity allows the message recipient to circumvent adhering to egalitarian racial 
norms. White voters exposed to an implicit Latino appeal do not produce statistically 
significant candidate favorability ratings relative to the control. However, the success of 
the explicit–Latino appeal suggests that there is no norm to circumvent, thereby 
invalidating the entire theoretical foundation upon which the IE model is predicated. 
Additionally, there is no statistically significant difference between the candidate 
favorability among respondents exposed to either implicit- or explicit-Latino appeals. 
These null findings point to the poor fit of the IE model for Latino appeals, but do not 
provide much insight as to whether candidates have carte blanche to use a variety anti-
Latino appeals without significant electoral repercussions. 
Chapter Four goes on to explore tacit appeals; a novel treatment manipulation I 
developed that aims to prime with racial imagery coupled with race neutral language. 
This novel appeal construction helps to explore the attribute of implicitness required to 
unconsciously prime racial thinking—especially in the hyper-racialized contemporary 
political environment where voters may be able to easily perceive the racial content of 
even coded, implicit racial messages. As a hyper-subtle appeal, the tacit treatment 
attempts to distinguish between implicit/unconsciousness priming and what might be 
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better understood as a conscious “motivation to control prejudice” (Blinder et.al 2016) or 
“plausible deniability.9”  
Chapter Five examines the ways in which candidate and respondent partisanship 
mediates the response to implicit and explicit racial campaign communications. Given the 
partisan polarization that dominates contemporary politics in the United States, questions 
arise as to whether partisan attachments or a commitment to racial egalitarianism 
dominate individual responses to racial appeals—especially as the polarization runs along 
a partisan cleavage regarding racial attitudes and issues. 
  
 
9 In The Race Card (2001) Mendelberg states that the quality of implicitness is a racial message’s 
“deniability.” However, I am arguing that if the power of an implicit appeal is its ability to unconsciously 
prime, then the appeal must not be evaluated for its racial content at all. Any consideration of whether 
race is or is not part of the message construction, deciding whether an appeal contains “plausible 
deniability,” moves the prime into the realm of conscious decision making. 
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CHAPTER 4 




This chapter takes a closer look at the psychological mechanisms embedded in the 
Implicit Explicit (IE) model of racial priming. In doing so, I will explore the interactions 
between appeal content, racial norms, and racial resentment. I take seriously the notion 
that contemporary campaign communications take place in a hyper-racialized political 
context (Tesler, 2016). Recent scholarship on racial priming is quick to attribute changes 
in the impact of implicit and explicit appeals to a retrenched norm of racial equality 
(Valentino et al., 2018; Reny et al. 2019). Yet, these changes might just as easily be 
attributed to a shift in the perception of what constitutes an implicit appeal in today’s 
political communications environment.  
Recall from previous chapters that the power of an implicit appeal is derived from 
its ambiguity and plausible deniability. It may be that in the contemporary 
communications environment, racial stereotypes and messaging are so easily perceived 
that implicit appeals no longer have the power they once did to “unconsciously” prime 
racial considerations. Instead, the code words utilized in implicit appeals bring with them 
the same set of race conscious considerations as would explicitly racial nouns and 
adjectives. My findings in Chapter 3 provide some preliminary support for this assertion; 
the respondents in the implicit-Black treatment registered lower candidate favorability 
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scores than those in the control. This finding suggests that respondents in this condition 
regarded the appeal as if it contained an explicit-Black message. 
In this chapter, I will dig deeper into the psychology of priming (Mendelberg, 
2001) and the ways that ambiguity and ambivalence mediate individual responses to 
racial appeals. In testing message ambiguity, I introduce a novel, more subtle, visual 
message that I call a “tacit” appeal. Tacit appeals attempt to prime racial considerations 
with only visual images of the group targeted in a campaign advertisement. They are 
“hyper-implicit” appeals that omit the code word that would typically accompany the 
racial imagery in an implicit appeal. By re-focusing attention onto the qualities that 
constitute “implicitness,” rather than replicating the rote operationalization of implicit 
appeals, I hope to elucidate the rhetorical and visual features that contribute to the 
success of contemporary racial appeals. 
In testing the impact of ambivalence on message reception, I look closely at the 
conditional effects of racial resentment across Black- and Latino-treatments. Per my 
theory of Permanent Foreigner Positionality, I will argue that the norm of racial equality 
in the priming literature has been conflated with what would more appropriately be 
labeled a norm of African American equality. As a result, there is a strong countervailing 
force that checks the expression of anti-Black attitudes, even among individuals who 
express higher levels of racial resentment (an African American-oriented index). 
Conversely, the egalitarian values that would guide the normative responses to Latino 
appeals have not been sufficiently developed.  Without egalitarian norms and positive 
racial attributes to populate white Americans’ Latino racial schema, a truly ambivalent 
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set of attitudes that can be mobilized in either a positive or negative direction is not 
possible. 
 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF IMPLICIT COMMUNICATION, REVISITED 
Considering the recent racial priming research that has been published with null 
results for implicit appeals, it is important to revisit the psychological mechanisms that 
undergird successful racial communication. This review is important in order to 
understand why the IE model seems to be failing to explain for the impacts of 
contemporary racial appeals. Without a theoretical understanding of how appeal content, 
racial norms, and racial predispositions interact to create disparate outcomes, researchers 
may get caught looking in the wrong places for particular outcomes, or misattributing 
causality. For example, null results for implicit appeals may be attributed to a waning 
norm of equality when it could be equally likely that the implicit appeal is no longer read 
as “implicit” in today’s communications environment. Likewise, I find the claim that the 
norm of African American equality is in retrenchment to be wholly undertheorized and 
under supported by empirical data. I am not ready to accept this claim—especially in 
light of the fact that my findings for Black appeals from Chapter Three fit neatly within 
the IE model as it was originally developed. 
In this section, I revisit the psychology of implicit communication as described by 
Mendelberg in The Race Card (2001, Chapter Four). To date, it is the most 
comprehensive assessment of the psychological processes involved when an individual is 
exposed to racial messages. This is because Mendelberg’s theory speaks to both the 
individual-level psychological schema, as well as the contextual prerequisites needed to 
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meet for a successful racial appeal. After laying out the theoretical framework, I will go 
on to describe the ways that the framework should be applied to explain contemporary 
anti-Black and anti-Latino appeals. I will conclude this section by critiquing the ways in 
which the replication of implicit-explicit conventions within published scholarly research 
on racial priming may have concealed some of the psychological processes at play and 
inadvertently misattributed causality or lack of findings. 
The success of implicit racial communication depends on four theoretical pillars: 
Ambivalence, Accessibility, Ambiguity, Awareness (Mendelberg 2001, Chapter Four). 
Ambivalence refers to the presence of conflicting racial attitudes. For conflicting racial 
attitudes to be present, they must consist of a constellation of positive and negative racial 
attitudes that are relatively on balance with one another. One set of attitudes (either 
positive or negative) should not dominate the racial schema an individual possesses for a 
particular racial group. In the priming literature, Ambivalence is represented by the 
conflict white voters feel between support for racial egalitarianism (positive valence) and 
continued negative stereotyping (negative valence) of African Americans as a racial 
group. Thus, whenever Blacks are referenced in social/political communication the full 
set of positive and negative attitudes that constitute a Black racial schema are brought to 
mind at once (though individuals may ascribe different weights to some set of either the 
positive or negative attitudes and express lower or higher levels of racial resentment, 
respectively).  
 This ability of a racial appeal to make racial predispositions more Accessible is 
the second pillar upon which the IE model is developed. While a Black racial schema 
may consist of ambivalent racial attitudes, the ability to prime a Black racial schema in 
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the mind of a message recipient is an attribute of the message itself. Racial schema may 
be made more or less accessible to the message recipient depending on the rhetorical-
visual features of a political campaign appeal. The language, along with the images, used 
in a political communication may or may not activate racial considerations. When racial 
predispositions are activated, a racial schema is considered primed and therefore 
available for subsequent political decision-making. This is not to say that the racial 
schema is the only consideration brought to bear on political decisions, rather that it is 
made more accessible for the racial appeal recipient compared to when racial schema lie 
latent in the recipient’s mind. 
Next, the form of the racial appeal will determine whether a racial schema comes 
into the recipient’s conscious or unconscious awareness. Priming has the greatest impact 
on normatively undesirable attitudes when it occurs outside of the recipient’s conscious 
awareness. When a message recipient is aware of the racial content of an appeal, it 
creates an opportunity for the recipient to select which racial attitudes to attend to within 
a particular racial schema. In turn, it creates the potential for the recipient to control the 
expression of the racial predispositions that have been primed. In other words, when a 
racial schema is brought into conscious awareness, the message recipient can select 
which among its constitutive positive and negative racial attitudes they will attend to 
and/or act upon. According to Mendelberg (2001, p. 123) when the norm of racial 
equality is sufficiently salient, an individual’s motivation to adhere to racial 
egalitarianism will more often supersede the negative racial stereotypes, resentments, and 
fear.  
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Conversely, negative racial stereotypes and predispositions will likely go 
unchecked when the message recipient is unaware of the racial content of an appeal. 
More recent scholarship (Blinder et al. 2013) corroborates this notion of norm-based 
cognitive control with a dual process model that accounts for both an individual’s 
motivation to control prejudice, as well as the context in which their personal motivation 
is triggered. Automatic responses toward out-group members tend to be negative. They 
are only checked when individuals who have a motivation (either internal or external) to 
control their prejudice encounter information that signals salient egalitarian norms or 
clear violations of such a norm. 
In the literature, this difference in cognitive control and subsequent political 
opinions and behavior has typically been attributed to explicit and implicit appeals. 
However, the key distinction is not so much the form of the appeal, but rather whether its 
content brings racial predispositions (both positive and negative racial attitudes) into the 
conscious awareness of the message recipient. Explicit and implicit appeals have been 
operationalized in the literature by their rhetorical-visual content; explicit appeals contain 
racial nouns and adjectives, whereas implicit appeals are veiled references to race that 
typically take on the form of a racial image paired with a code word. According to the IE 
model of racial priming, the success of any racial appeal to mobilize negative racial 
predispositions lies in its ability to have the racial content remain outside the conscious 
awareness of the message recipient. Outside of conscious awareness, the appeal is 
processed automatically, rather than reflected upon with an opportunity for a controlled 
response. 
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Finally, Ambiguity is the ability of a message to be perceived in more than one 
way. A racial appeal appears ambiguous when its racial content is veiled by rhetorical-
visual cues. It is implicit to the extent that makes race seem tangential or incidental to the 
overall message. Because the racial content is present, but not communicated in a clear of 
direct manner, the racial schema is primed outside of the conscious awareness of the 
message recipient. As a result, ambiguous racial appeals are highly successful at 
mobilizing racial predispositions because they unconsciously prime racial schema and 
evade the attendant check to conform to the norm of racial equality. In the priming 
literature, this quality of ambiguity has been uniquely ascribed to implicit appeals. This is 
due to the way that racial appeals have been operationalized; racial images in 
combination with code words have been perceived as oblique references to race that 
operate outside of the message recipient’s awareness, whereas explicit appeals make the 
racial content apparent.  
To briefly summarize, four axioms must be present for racial appeals to impact 
subsequent political decision-making: Ambivalence, Accessibility, Awareness, and 
Ambiguity. Ambivalence refers to a racial schema that consists of positive and negative 
racial affects. It is a product of the contextual features of the socio-political 
communications environment in which negative racial stereotypes are simultaneously 
present and in competition with a prevailing norm of racial equality. Accessibility, 
whether racial predispositions are latent or primed, and awareness, whether primed racial 
schema are processed by the recipient’s conscious or unconscious Awareness, refer to the 
position of the racial schema in the mind of the message recipient. Finally, Ambiguity 
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resides in the racial appeal itself and refers to perceptibility along with the plausible 
deniability of the racial content.  
I want to highlight that in considering the above axioms that serve as the 
psychological foundation of successful racial campaign appeals, there may be a degree of 
variation in the axioms of Ambivalence and Ambiguity. Ambivalence and ambiguity both 
have several contextual attributes that are driven by and interact with factors external to 
an individual’s cognizance. While accessibility and awareness are features of individual 
cognition, ambivalence and ambiguity depend on an interaction between individual 
cognition and the context in which it takes place. Accessibility and awareness relate to 
the availability of racial schema within an individual’s psychological landscape. 
Ambivalence and ambiguity rest upon an interplay of individual psychology alongside 
the meaning attributed to message form and content, according to the communications 
environment within which the message is received. Messages need to be anchored within 
the context of the communications environment if they are to convey meaningful content 
to their recipients. The impacts of variations in individual-level attributes, message form 
and content, and the socio-political context in which the message is broadcast are 
explored in detail in the following two sections. 
 
APPLICATION OF AMBIVALENCE IN THE EXTANT PRIMING LITERATURE 
Ambivalence, from the perspective of political psychology, is the culmination of 
affective judgements toward an object containing both negative and positive valences. 
Each of the pieces of information that construct a generic knowledge structure, or 
schema, about an object can have a magnitude and direction (Fiske and Taylor 1991). As 
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racial priming theory is interested in the ways that ambivalent racial attitudes create a 
tension that can be exploited by elite communications, it is important to keep in mind that 
ambivalent racial attitudes must contain both positive and negative attributes. An 
ambivalent racial schema will consist of an array of both the positive and negative racial 
experiences and narratives available in the communication environment. Therefore, the 
racial schema includes all the contextual information an individual can draw from when 
developing or assessing their own racial attitude(s). The racial attitude itself will be the 
summary of the valence and weight given to each piece of information that makes up the 
schema at any given point in-time.  
The extant scholarship on racial attitude formation, impact, and change has long 
established racial resentment as a measure that taps individual racial attitudes (Kinder and 
Sanders 1996; Tesler 2016). Racial resentment is measured with a standard four-question 
battery of questions (see Appendix C for full question wording) from the American 
National Elections Survey (ANES), indexed to a 0-1 scale. The range of attitudes is 
determined by the conflicting narratives in the communications environment regarding 
the socioeconomic position of African Americans in the United States. The racially 
liberal responses support discrimination and structural causes for racial inequality, while 
the racially conservative responses point to individual failures and cultural deficiencies. 
Racial priming scholars have overwhelmingly used racial resentment as an independent 
variable that interacts with treatment assignment and polarizes responses to experimental 
treatments (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002; Huber and 
Lipinski 2006; White 2007; Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin 2010; Reny, Valenzuela, 
and Collingwood 2019). Across studies, high-resentment respondents are more willing 
76
tolerate or accept racial content than their low-resentment counterparts who are, in turn, 
more disposed to disavow racial messages. 
 
APPLICATION OF AMBIGUITY IN THE EXTANT PRIMING LITERATURE 
In the following sections, I will cover the limited ways in which the racial priming 
literature has explored variations in the perception of ambiguity and offer several novel 
conceptual insights. Paramount of which is that I emphasize that ambiguity is not an 
absolute property that is internal to the form and content of an appeal. Instead, I argue 
that ambiguity a is a quality of an appeals that is conditioned on an interaction among 
individual-level attributes, the communications context within which the message is 
received, and the form and content of the racial appeal itself. Recall from above that 
ambiguity is the ability of a message to be perceived in more than one way which helps 
conceal its racial content. According to the IE model of racial priming, the power of an 
implicit appeal is derived from its ambiguity because the obscured racial content allows 
the message recipient to evade a normative check on the activation of negative racial 
predispositions. However, the perception of message ambiguity may vary among 
message recipients and/or among communications contexts. 
 
The binary operationalization of racial appeals 
Within the racial priming literature, a strict binary has developed for the 
operationalization of explicit and implicit appeals that has been largely divorced from its 
perceived ambiguity. Explicit appeals are defined by the use of racial nouns or adjectives 
(“Blacks,” “Latinos,” Black people, etc.). Implicit appeals are defined by the combination 
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of a racial image paired with a racial code word that is stereotypically associated with the 
visual in the appeal (the Willie Horton ad, for example, used an image of a Black man 
with the code word “criminal”). While numerous studies recognize that implicit appeals 
may be communicated with visual or verbal content (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, 
Hutchings, and White 2002), that group-centric issues and code words without images are 
sufficient to prime racial attitudes (Gilens 1999; Hurwitz and Piffle 2005), and that 
implicit appeals may exist on a continuum rather than in a strict binary relationship to 
explicit appeals (Valenzuela and Reny 2020; Valentino et al 2002), the scholarship on 
racial priming has largely replicated the dichotomous operationalization as convention. 
Under this conventional operationalization, appeals achieve implicit status based on their 
form (racial image along with code word), rather than possessing a quality of 
“implicitness”—ambiguity or plausible deniability. This is particularly problematic for 
the study of racial appeals and maintaining the theoretical integrity of the IE model. 
When attention is given only to the rhetorical-visual content of an appeal and not to 
whether the message is ambiguous, studies in racial priming and of the IE model risk 
mislabeling implicit appeals and misattributing the impacts of various racial campaign 
messages. Furthermore, I want to emphasize that as ambiguity is not an internal property 
of the appeal message, consideration should be given to whom an appeal is ambiguous 
and in which political communication environments. 
 
Individual-level variation in perceived message ambiguity 
Racial priming scholars have demonstrated that the perception of ambiguity in 
campaign appeals can depend on the individual-level attributes of the message recipient 
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including, but not limited to, race/ethnicity (White 2007; Masuoka and Junn 2016), 
gender (Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin 2010), education (Huber and Lipinski 2006), 
political knowledge (Huber and Lapinski 2006), partisanship (Nteta, Lisi, and Tarsi 2016, 
see also Chapter Five of this manuscript), and ideology (see also Valenzuela and Reny 
2020 for comprehensive discussion of variation which the literature has and can explore). 
Therefore, the rhetorical-visual features of an ambiguous appeal that appear salient may 
vary based on the message recipient’s intersectional identity, as well as the values, issues, 
and ideologies that are important to them and their communities (White 2007; Masuoka 
and Junn 2013).  
I contend that racial appeals may be received as either implicit or explicit 
depending on their perceived ambiguity (or lack thereof) for different message recipients 
depending on the salience of the rhetorical-visual racial content of the appeal. Some 
individuals or groups may be more sensitized than others to the racial content of an 
appeal or better able to discern the ways in which particular rhetorical-visual features 
may be manipulated to conceal a racial message. Variation in the perception of what 
constitutes an ambiguous appeal is likely seen in the range of responses captured by the 
confidence intervals around the mean response to different experimental treatments 
throughout the literature. Experiments on racial priming have succeeded in limiting some 
of this variation by focusing primarily on the impact of racial appeals on white 
respondents’ political opinions (thereby reducing, though certainly not eliminating, 
individual-level variation). Additionally, many priming experiments have taken an 
additional step in testing the perceived ambiguity of their implicit and explicit treatments 
by asking a set of respondents to assess whether the treatment manipulations contained 
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racial content (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino et al. 2018; Reny et al. 2019). These 
treatment assessments reveal that while impressions of the appeal content may on balance 
affirm the operationalization that the authors intended to convey with their manipulations, 
they nevertheless display a large degree of variation even when limited to only white 
respondents. 
 
Communications environment impact on perceived message ambiguity  
The communications environment also has an impact on the perceived ambiguity 
of a racial appeal. Issues and issue frames will vary in their ability to bring racial 
considerations to mind depending on their salience for the message recipient (White 
2007). Issue salience is the strength with which an issue primes a particular set of ideas, 
attitudes, and predispositions. Once primed, these thoughts are more readily available for 
a message recipient to access in forming political opinions or making political decisions. 
Issue salience may wax and wane depending on the individual-level attributes noted 
above; it may also be the product of the socio-political and media contexts in which the 
appeal is made. Media coverage can impact issue salience and its priming ability (Iyengar 
and Kinder 1987). Through its agenda-setting capacity, the media selects which issues are 
newsworthy and will therefore receive coverage. This, in turn, has a priming effect which 
makes information about the issues covered by the news, and covered more often, more 
easily accessible when making decisions in relation to other issues or ideas. 
Likewise, media coverage can also lead to the racialization of policies or issue 
frames. In doing so, racial attitudes are brought to bear on the evaluations of a policy or 
issue area. For some race-targeted policies in which there is a substantive link between 
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the policy and its beneficiaries, racialization may be inevitable (Sears 1993). However, 
racialization can also occur for genuinely non-racial policies through their issue framing 
(Hurwitz and Peffley 2005) or their repeated pairing with images or reports of particular 
racial groups (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013). This 
explains why racial attitudes influence responses to non-racial policy questions such as 
welfare (Gilens 1999; Mendelberg 2001), crime (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Hurwitz and 
Peffley 1997, 2005; Mendelberg 2001), social security (Winter 2007), gun control 
(Filindra and Kaplan 2014), and the Iraq War (White 2007). The ostensibly non-racial 
content of these policies is exactly what supports the notion of their ambiguity and makes 
them effective “code words” in racial appeals. 
Reny and colleagues (2019) have developed the concept of group-issue 
congruence to describe the extent to which an issue has been racialized to prime group-
specific ideas, attitudes, and predispositions. They note that highly congruent racial 
appeals can facilitate message recipients’ understanding of its racial content. It is easier 
for respondents to “read-between-the-lines” and decipher the racial content for group-
issue parings with a “high” degree of congruence compared to those with “low” 
congruence. Thus, high group-issue congruence reduces message ambiguity because the 
issue featured in a campaign appeal will on its own have the ability to make the message 
recipient aware of racial considerations. 
While the dichotomous operationalization of implicit and explicit appeals has 
proved useful, it is important to acknowledge that implicit appeals may not be operating 
in today’s “most racial” (Tesler 2016) communications environment the way that they 
would be anticipated to based solely on an operationalization which was developed and 
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crystallized nearly two decades prior. Tesler (2016) argues that Barack Obama’s 
presidency made race more salient for the American public, and in turn, polarized mass 
politics around issues of race. As a result, American political opinion is more heavily 
influenced by racial considerations today than it has been since the Civil Rights 
movement. This helped to further expedite a secular partisan realignment that had begun 
the 1960’s by sorting the most racially conservative whites into the Republican Party 
(Valentino and Sears 2005; Lublin 2004). 
Recent scholarship has recognized that the hyper-racialized context in which 
contemporary political communications take place may have altered racial message 
reception and perception. Some scholars suggest that this has affected the vote-calculus 
of political candidates in deciding whether to strategically employ implicit or explicit 
campaign appeals (Valentino et al 2018). For these scholars, the racialized 
communications context has led to the retrenchment of the norm of racial equality which 
has made many Americans are more tolerant of explicit racial appeals. This shift, along 
with partisan redistricting, has created safe (Republican) districts in which candidates can 
deploy explicitly racial appeals with little to no negative consequences. Other scholars 
argue that this racialized communications environment has altered the message reception 
by voters who can better perceive the racial content embedded in an implicit appeal 
(Reny et al. 2019). While both of these claims suggest that some learning has taken place 
for either the candidates’ campaigns or the mass public, neither of these advancements 
considers that a hyper-racialized communication environment may also drive changes in 
the form that an appeal must take in order to remain veiled.  
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The success of implicit communication rests on the ambiguity of the message. 
Therefore, if the electorate has become more racially perceptive and sensitive to coded 
messages they will no longer be received as “implicit.”  Instead, coded appeals will often 
evoke responses that are more similar to those that would result from an “explicit” appeal 
in which the racial content is in plain sight (though, not universally perceived as 
“explicit” because of individual-level variation). My results from Chapter 3, which 
compared implicit and explicit appeals, offers preliminary evidence for this possibility. 
At least some portion of the electorate is reacting to implicit-Black appeals as if they 
were explicit-Black appeals by depressing candidate support in relation to the control. In 
order to test the impact of variations in the form and content of ambiguous, coded 
appeals, I developed a novel operationalization called tacit appeals which I discuss in 
greater detail below. 
 
INTRODUCING TACIT APPEALS 
For this study, I developed a novel, more subtle, implicit appeal that I call a 
“tacit” appeal. While implicit appeals attempt to prime racial predispositions with a 
message combining racial imagery with a code word stereotypically associated with the 
racial group visually featured in the message, the tacit appeals attempt to prime racial 
considerations with only visual images of the racial group targeted in a campaign 
advertisement. These are “hyper-implicit” appeals that omit the code word that would 
typically accompany the racial imagery in an implicit appeal. Prior scholarship has 
acknowledged the possibility that not all implicit appeals are equal—some may be better 
able to prime racial considerations better than others (Valentino 2002). The tacit 
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manipulation builds off this assertion and formalizes the rhetorical-visual variation 
among various coded appeals. Overall, my research design tests a very narrow set of 
rhetorical-visual manipulations which creates an opportunity to isolate variables and 
more accurately assign causality. By leaving nearly all aspects of the treatments 
consistent across conditions it creates a higher level of confidence that the movement 
observed in respondent reactions may be attributed to the specific rhetorical and visual 
features that were altered. 
 The race-neutral language of the tacit appeals allows for an examination of 
several important theoretical implications for racial priming studies. First, it moves away 
from the rote replication of implicit appeals as operationalized as “visual image plus code 
word” and refocuses attention on to the actual qualities—ambiguity and plausible 
deniability—that constitute implicitness. By narrowly manipulating the presence or 
absence of code words alongside racial imagery, I can isolate whether the visual or verbal 
cues are driving the racial considerations that are primed by exposure to a racial appeal. 
This is a significant contribution as racial priming scholars (Gilens 1999; Hurwitz and 
Peffley 2005; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002) suggest that 
either words or images alone could constitute an implicit appeal if the racial meaning can 
be inferred, yet to my understanding this tenet has yet to be empirically tested directly. 
Relatedly, the tacit appeal reveals the relative strength of visual and verbal cues. 
The psychological mechanism embedded in racial priming theory asserts that racial 
appeals are successful because they are automatically processed outside of the message 
recipient’s conscious awareness. Compared to words, images convey more information 
in a shorter amount of time that allows for more automatic processing (Mendelberg 2001, 
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127-128). The meaning of a visual image may also be perceived as more ambiguous than 
the verbal content. A more subtle appeal that uses racial imagery alone should more 
powerfully prime racial considerations than an implicit appeal that traditionally utilizes a 
verbal code word alongside a racial image. 
Finally, the tacit manipulation takes seriously the “most racial” (Tesler 2016) 
political context in which contemporary campaign communications are taking place. It 
offers an opportunity to observe whether the conventional understanding of implicitness 
is relevant in this new hyper-racialized communications environment, or if the power of 
implicit appeals to mobilize racial attitudes has migrated to a more subtle form of 
communication. If people are better able to “read between the lines” of coded appeals, 
their effectiveness in mobilizing racial considerations would be reduced. Likewise, tacit 
appeals allow for an examination of the ways that variations in the degree of ambivalence 
within racial schema may play out within the “two sides of racialization” (Tesler 2016). 
High- and low-resentment individuals may respond differently to racial cues in this more 
racialized context. 
 
Ambiguity—tacit appeal hypotheses 
As I have designated tacit appeals as more subtle versions of implicit appeals that 
use only visual cues to convey their racial content, they will contain a higher degree of 
ambiguity. As a result, I expect tacit appeals will more powerfully prime racial 
resentment and do so outside of the respondent’s conscious awareness.  Following 
Mendelberg’s (2001) IE model, tacit-Black appeals more powerfully mobilize candidate 
favorability compared implicit-Black appeals (H4.1). To the contrary, in the absence of a 
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strong countervailing norm of Latino egalitarianism, Permanent Foreigner Positionality 
suggests that tacit-Latino appeals are not governed by the psychology of implicit 
communication. Thus, tacit-Latino appeals are no more effective than implicit-Latino 
appeals at mobilizing candidate favorability (H4.2). It should also be noted that there is 
likely a limit on the ability of subtle appeals to prime racial considerations. That limit 
would be governed by the capacity of a subtle appeal to convey race-relevant 
information. Tacit appeals may be constructed in such a way that, in the absence of an 
accompanying code word, their racial content is too subtle to be perceived by message 
recipients and would therefore have no distinguishable effect on recipient opinion (H0). 
 
Ambivalence—racial resentment hypotheses  
Racial priming scholarship argues that across treatments, high resentment 
respondents are more willing to accept racial content than their low resentment 
counterparts who are generally unmoved by racial messages. Though, Mendelberg (2001) 
finds that even low resentment individuals can be mobilized by implicit appeals when 
they feel assured they are acting in a normatively acceptable manner. Norms are socially 
agreed upon notions of how to conduct oneself in a society. In order to retain their 
significance and ability to constrain individual behavior, they must be continuously 
upheld and reinforced by society, especially by authority figures such as political elites. 
Recent scholarship demonstrates that elite communications help signal to the mass public 
the normative bounds for the expression of prejudice (Crandall, Miller, and White 2018). 
When elite rhetoric turns more prejudiced or racist, racially conservative members of the 
mass public are “emboldened” to more openly express or act on their prejudicial beliefs 
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or racist attitudes (Scaffner 2018; Newman et al. 2020). However, taking into account the 
“two sides of racialization,” (Tesler 2016) we have also seen that racially liberal whites 
demonstrate high levels of backlash against racist cues and rhetoric (Luttig, Federico, and 
Lavine 2017; Tesler 2016). 
Applying these normative considerations to my experimental treatments, explicit 
appeals contain the most overt expressions of negative racial attitudes and prejudice 
while tacit appeals are the most racially ambiguous. According to the racial resentment 
index, high-resentment individuals have more negative racial attitudes or prejudiced 
beliefs than their low-resentment counterparts. It follows then, that when receiving more 
overtly racist messages, high-resentment individuals will respond as though they are in a 
space where it is safe to express their own racist attitudes. Therefore, I expect highly 
resentful respondents will react most favorably to explicit racial appeals (H4.3). 
Additionally, low-resentment respondents will backlash most strongly against these 
explicit appeals and register the most negative favorability ratings for the sponsoring 
candidate (H4.4). Conversely, low-resentment respondents will react most favorably to 
tacit appeals (H4.5), whereas high-resentment respondents will give more constrained 
responses in the face of more ambiguous elite signals (H4.6). In the absence of explicit 
racial rhetoric, or even code words, tacit appeals will appear normatively acceptable 
when communicated by political elites. 
One final note of importance is that my theory of Persistent Foreigner 
Positionality (PFP) calls attention to the way in which the first axiom of the IE model 
(Ambivalence) is not firmly established for the Latino population in the United States, not 
in the way that it has been for African Americans (Chapter 2). While broad public 
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support for African American equality since the Civil Rights Movement has been 
substantiated by numerous studies (Kinder and Sears; Kinder and Sanders 1996), I argue 
that the norm of racial equality has never extended in any de facto manner to Latino or 
other non-Black minorities. As a result, white voters do not hold considerably ambivalent 
Latino attitudes; in the absence of a strong countervailing norm of Latino equality, their 
Latino attitudes likely carry a more negative valence on balance. Therefore, in the 
absence of ambivalence, the IE model is an inappropriate theory for accounting for the 
impact of Latino campaign appeals. Instead, I argue on behalf of my own theory of PFP; 
Latino appeal construction will not have distinguishable impacts on low- or high-
resentment respondent opinions (H4.7). I included all conditions in my analyses in order 
to articulate the difference in patterns across Black and Latino appeals. 
 
DESIGN 
Building on the design of the foundational experiment covered in Chapter Three, 
two additional treatment conditions were included in the survey experiment: Black-tacit 
and Latino-tacit. Respondents who participated in my 2016 CCES survey module were 
randomly exposed to one of a total seven different conditions: Black-explicit, Black-
implicit, Black-tacit, Latino-explicit, Latino-implicit, Latino-tacit, or the control. The 
tacit treatments were visually identical to all other voter ID mailers except they paired the 
racial images of voters at the polls with the race-neutral language used in the control (see 
Table 4.1). 
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Recall from Chapter Three that in each condition the respondents were first 
exposed to a computer screen that included a text preamble for the experiment which 
randomized the fictitious Congressman’s partisanship:  
“On the next page, you will see some campaign materials from Democratic 
[Republican] Congressman, Don Williams, that will be followed by a short set of 




Following the preamble message, all respondents viewed the same “Election 
Day” mailer as described in the foundation experiment (Figure 3.1) and were then 
randomly assigned to one of the seven “Voter ID” mailer conditions (Table 4.1). 
Exposure to the mailer treatments were followed by a post-treatment questionnaire. 
 




The “Voter ID” issue mailers showed an image of the Capitol Building with an 
American Flag in the foreground overlaid with a text banner on top that read, “VOTER 
ID PREVENTS FRAUD” along with another, smaller text banner in the middle of the 
mailer that read, “Congressman Williams supports Voter ID laws.” The visual and 
rhetorical manipulations were overlaid in the area between these two text banners. For the 
tacit appeals, an image of members of the target racial group (Black or Latino) voting at 
an election polling location was placed on the left between the text banners and a text box 
with the race-neutral, control narrative was placed to the right: “Thousands of people are 
registered to vote in multiple states, violating our election laws.”  
 
Data 
Recall from Chapter 3 that the dual wave panel in the 2016 Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study (CCES) allowed me to ask questions about racial 
resentment in such a way that pre-treatment priming effects as well as any post-treatment 
conditioning effects (Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres 2018) could both be avoided. Prior 
research suggests that asking racial resentment questions shortly ahead of the 
experimental treatments may prime racial considerations across all treatments and 
produce null results (Mendelberg 2008). The pre-treatment questionnaire was 
administered to all respondents in the 2016 CCES (N=3,500) four to six weeks prior to 
when respondents in my survey model exposure to the experimental treatments were. 
Racial resentment was measured with the standard ANES 4-question battery (see 
Appendix C for full question wording). I indexed the responses to create a dummy 
variable for the respondents’ racial resentment scores. Respondents who did not answer 
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all four questions (n=244) were dropped from the index. A linear interaction effect is not 
assumed between racial resentment and the treatments (Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu 
2019), so the remaining respondents were then divided into high, medium10, and low 
resentment terciles according to their indexed racial resentment scores. While racial 
resentment was developed to measure attitudes toward African Americans, it is a 
relatively stable predisposition associated with outgroups prejudice (Carney and Enos 
2017; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009) and will be and correlated with anti-Latino 
attitudes. As a result, it is an appropriate measure to use in my analyses across both Black 
and Latino conditions. 
 
RESULTS 
In testing the hypotheses related to message ambiguity outlined above, I first 
estimated a regression model that examines the impact of implicit-, explicit-, and tacit- 
Black, and Latino, appeals relative to the control condition. A plot of the treatment effect 
coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals relative to the control can be seen in 
Figure 4.1. The results for implicit- and explicit- Black, and Latino, appeals were 
previously discussed in Chapter 3, though I include them in the models here in order to 
articulate the impact of tacit appeals more clearly in relation to the other conditions.  
The first noteworthy finding is that neither the tacit-Black treatment (0.527-
points, p=.832) nor the tacit-Latino treatment (3-points, p=.222) generated candidate 
favorability ratings that are statistically distinguished from the control. A t-test comparing 
 
10 Following the scholarship on racial priming, I excluded from my analyses moderately resentful 
respondents. Mendelberg (2001, 228) demonstrates that respondents who exhibit moderately resentful 
racial attitudes do not change their responses when exposed to implicit or explicit appeals.  
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the difference in means between the control and Black-tacit condition is not statistically 
significant (p=.896) nor is the difference between the control and Latino-tacit condition 
(p=.197). As tacit appeals do not generate results statistically distinguished from the 
control, it is not clear whether tacit appeals are too subtle and do not communicate racial 
considerations with images alone. It is possible that the voter ID issue is racially salient 
for both the racial groups featured in the racial appeals and is priming racial 
considerations on its own. The voter ID issue may create a baseline effect that is not 
impacted by adding racial imagery. Including an image of African American or Latino 
voters at the polls does not significantly alter respondents’ responses to the treatment 
stimulus. This interpretation is in line with the notion that group-centric issues and code 
words without images are sufficient enough to prime racial attitudes (Gilens 1999; 
Hurwitz and Peffley 2005). If the voter ID issue is in fact racialized for both of the racial 
groups in my study, then these null findings may also indicate that the results for the 
implicit- and explicit- Black, and Latino, conditions are conservative estimates relative to 
control. The voter ID issue may be producing a baseline measure that is already racially 
responsive.  
When looking at the regression coefficients for the full set of African American 
appeals alone, the magnitude of the candidate favorability ratings moves in an 
increasingly positive direction from explicit to implicit and then to tacit appeals, as 
hypothesized. When moving from an explicit-Black appeal to a tacit-Black appeal, a t-
test shows that there is a 9-point gain in mean candidate favorability (p < .001) compared 
to the 7-point gain earned from moving from an explicit- to implicit-Black appeal (p 
=.009). Overall, this trend is in line with what the IE model would predict for very subtle 
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implicit appeals that rely only on racial images to communicate their racial content. 
Tacit-Black appeals more successfully mobilize candidate support than explicit-Black 
appeals (H4.1). However, a two-tailed difference of means test shows that the movement 




Figure 4.1: OLS Regression Coefficients for Candidate Favorability for All 
Conditions with 95% Confidence Intervals
 
 
It is interesting that this trend does not appear among the regression coefficients 
for the Latino appeals. Relative to the control, only exposure to an explicit-Latino 
increases candidate favorability with marginal statistical significance (5-points, p=.052). 
The regression coefficients for the implicit- and tacit-Latino treatments do not achieve 
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standard levels of significance. Otherwise, there are no statistical differences between the 
mean responses among the Latino experimental conditions. 
 
Conditional effects of racial resentment 
 Turning to the conditional effects of racial resentment within each of the 
treatments, I again ran an OLS regression on all the treatments conditioned first on low- 
and then on high-racial resentment. The regression coefficients with 95% confidence 
intervals are presented in Figure 4.2 for both the populations of low- and high-resenters. 
Notice first, that only the respondents (both high- and low-resentment) in the explicit-
Black condition generate candidate favorability ratings that are statistically significant 
from the high-and low-resentment respondents in the control treatment. In line with the 
IE model, both high- and low-resentment respondents in the explicit-Black condition 
generate lower candidate favorability ratings than those in the control condition. As 
hypothesized (H4.4), low-resentment individuals exposed to an explicit-Black appeal 
depress their candidate favorability ratings by -16 points (p < .001). Low-resentment 
respondents strongly disavow the explicit anti-Black appeal and punish the ad sponsor.  
Yet, contrary to my hypothesis (H4.3), highly resentful individuals exposed to the 
same explicit-Black treatment also depress their candidate favorability scores in relation 
to the control, though to a lesser extent and at a marginally standard level of significance 
(-6 points, p=.058). Despite the signaling from a political elite that anti-Black 
considerations are normatively acceptable, I do not observe an “emboldening effect” 
(Newman et al. 2020; Schaffner 2020) among the high racial resenters in my sample. 
Instead, respondents with high racial resentment behave very much like those with low 
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resentment in distancing themselves from a candidate who is making overtly anti-Black 
appeals. Though, a comparison of these results using a two-tailed test of significance 
reveals that while both high- and low-resentment respondents depress their candidate 
favorability scores when exposed to explicit appeals, low-resenters demonstrate a far 
greater magnitude of disapproval than the high-resenters at a very high level of 
significance (-44.24, p<.001, see also Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.2: OLS Regression Coefficients with 95% Confidence Intervals for 




The results for low-resentment respondents exposed to the implicit-Black 
treatment does not reach statistical significance (–6-points, p=.130) relative to the low-
resenters in the control. Still, the null result is a departure from the traditional 
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conceptualization and operationalization of implicit appeals within the priming literature. 
The IE model of racial appeals would anticipate that low-resentment respondents would 
be mobilized by implicit-Black appeals and register higher candidate favorability ratings. 
It is also interesting that high-resentment respondents do not show a statistically 
significant difference in their candidate evaluations compared to their high-resentment 
counterparts in the control. This null finding where the IE model would predict an 
increase in candidate favorability also offers modest support for the notion that implicit-
Black appeals are no longer read as racially ambiguous in the hyper-racialized, 
contemporary communications environment. 
The results for the high- and low-resenters in the explicit-Latino treatment do not 
attain statistical significance in relation to the control, although they certainly indicate 
that high- and low-resentment respondents behave in a manner that is dissimilar to their 
counterparts in the explicit-Black treatment (H4.7). The null results across all the Latino 
conditions do not lend firm support to my theory of Permanent Foreigner Positionality. 
While the above regression analyses are useful for observing the different 
treatment effects on high- and low-resentment respondents (as two separate populations) 
it does not reveal much about how an individual’s racial resentment impacts candidate 
favorability within the various treatments. When a margins plot is used to compare the 
mean candidate favorability scores of high- and low-resentment respondents we see 
consistently large and highly significant disparate results (Figure 4.3). The large and 
highly significant difference of means between the candidate favorability ratings of high- 
and low-resentment respondents in the control condition (34.48, p <.001) lend support to 
the likelihood that the voter ID issue is racialized. This issue appears to be priming racial 
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considerations absent of other layers of rhetorical or visuals cues. However, I am open to 
the possibility that the results for the anti-Latino appeals could also be an artifact of racial 
resentment as a measure of anti-Black affect that is not oriented toward anti-Latino 
attitudes. 
 
Figure 4.3: Predicted Outcomes Plots of Mean Candidate Favorability Ratings for 






 This chapter presented an expanded experimental test of Mendelberg’s (2001) IE 
Model for contemporary Black and Latino appeals by introducing tacit appeals and 
variations in implicitness. Tacit appeals are hyper-implicit appeals that attempt to 
increase racial message ambiguity by priming racial considerations with images alone. 
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These tacit treatments use race-neutral rhetoric by employing the word “people” in place 
of naming the racial group featured in the appeal (“Black”/“Latino”) in the explicit 
treatments, or in place of the racial group code word (“criminals”/“immigrants”) used 
respectively in the implicit treatments. Overall, the very narrow set of treatment 
manipulations allows for the observation of respondent reactions to very specific and 
strategic distinctions in the rhetorical-visual content of a racial appeal.  
When testing variations in message ambiguity, the lack of statistical significance 
among the regression coefficients the experimental conditions can be interpreted in one 
of two ways; either the control is not sufficiently distinguished from the treatment 
conditions, or the tacit appeal is too subtle to convey a racial message. Though, the null 
results for the Black-tacit and Latino-tacit appeals in particular, point to the strong 
likelihood of the former; that the control is priming racial considerations across both the 
Black and Latino conditions. Tacit appeals are distinguished from the control only in that 
they provide a visual image of the racial group featured in the appeal. Following the 
inferences Masuoka and Junn (2016) make regarding the ways that immigration policy is 
racialized by comparing respondent responses to the treatment and control conditions, I 
can assess whether voter ID laws are bringing to mind either or both racial groups 
targeted by the appeals in my study. As the presence, or absence, of a racial group image 
does not impact respondents’ candidate favorability in any significant manner, then the 
voter ID issue may be sufficiently racialized for both Blacks and Latino groups to prime 
racial thinking on its own. This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that high- and 
low-resentment respondents have significantly different reactions from one another in the 
control condition, therefore creating disparate baselines for each subgroup (Figure 4.3).  
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If the null findings for the tacit conditions are in fact the result of an insufficiently 
distinguished control for each racial group, it may also indicate that the results for the 
implicit and explicit appeals are conservative estimates as the voter ID issue in the 
control is producing a baseline measure that is already racially responsive. Previous 
studies have often used a non-racial stimulus in the control to generate a more accurate 
measure of baseline candidate or policy support (e.g.: “environmental cleanup” in the 
norms experiment in Mendelberg 2001, Chapter 8, 209-236; “common [household] 
product commercials” in Valentino et al. 2002, 78; “Get Out The Vote” appeal in Huber 
and Lapinski 2006, 423; “handheld electronic games” article in Hutchings, Walton, and 
Benjamin 2010, 1179). This is a limitation of my study design, though it supports recent 
research relative to the ways that media reports can entangle racial groups into political 
issues, to an extent that the issue can prime racialized thinking in the absence of other 
racial cues. 
As in Chapter Three, I continue to find support for the IE model among Black 
appeals, but do not find support for the model among Latino appeals. Among Black 
appeals, the explicit appeal generates a statistically significant result that demonstrates 
that white voters continue to disavow overtly racist rhetoric in contemporary political 
campaigns and withdraw their support from the sponsoring candidate. Likewise, the 
implicit-Black appeals fail to mobilize racial attitudes in support of increased candidate 
favorability ratings.  
I take this null finding for the effect of implicit-Black appeals as tepid support for 
Reny and colleague’s (2019) claim that white voters are better able to glean the racial 
content of highly congruent, coded, anti-Black appeals in the hyper-racial 
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communications environment in which contemporary campaigns take place. The results 
for high- and low-resentment respondents in this implicit-Black condition also lend 
support to the possibility that implicit-Black appeals have lost their ability to mobilize 
anti-Black attitudes in contemporary campaigns. One thing to note however, is that most 
experiments on racial priming have not included a control group. Therefore, the positive 
coefficients for implicit appeals would have been relative to explicit appeals. Without a 
control, it is unclear as to whether the difference was due to a depression of favorability 
among respondents exposed to explicit appeals, or whether there was a positive 
mobilization among respondents exposed to the implicit appeal. In all, the findings in this 
chapter for explicit- and implicit-Black appeals lend themselves to the notion that the 
norm of African American equality continues to be a relevant and fairly robust influence 
on white voter behavior in America today.  
Another key finding of my study is the significant and positive regression 
coefficient for candidate favorability among respondents in the explicit-Latino condition. 
This finding stands in contrast to the results for the explicit-Black condition. Respondents 
exposed to an overtly racial appeal that features Latino images and rhetoric responded 
positively to the candidate sponsoring the appeal. This finding is contrary to the IE theory 
of racial priming and offers some support to my theory of Permanent Foreigner 
Positionality. The norm of racial equality has been conflated with a norm of African 
American equality and that Latino egalitarianism has not been embraced by the American 
public to a degree that would present a sufficient counterbalance to the negative Latino 
stereotypes held by white voters. In the absence of a truly ambivalent constellation of 
Latino attitudes, respondents did not disavow the explicit-Latino appeal because it does 
100
not trigger a need for conformity with a norm of egalitarianism in the way that explicit 
Black content does. 
This contrast is replicated over the full set of treatments between the Black and 
Latino conditions. Though the regression coefficients are not always statistically 
significant, we see that among the Black conditions, there is a pattern of growing 
candidate favorability associated with the increased ambiguity of the appeal. Among anti-
Black appeals, respondents responded most negatively to the overtly racial, explicit 
appeals. Relative to these explicit-Black appeals, respondents are not as negative towards 
candidates leveraging either the veiled, implicit appeal or subtle, tacit appeal. This is 
theoretically in line with the expectations of the IE model of racial priming if we concern 
ourselves with the psychological mechanisms at play, rather than with the operationalized 
form of the appeal alone.  
The results for the Latino conditions convey a different pattern: respondents 
reward the candidate with marginally significant, positive favorability scores when 
exposed to the explicit treatment and the results in the implicit and tacit treatments are 
statistically undistinguished from the explicit treatment. These different trends among the 
results for the sets of Black and Latino conditions speak to variations in ambivalence at 
the societal level which I attribute to the norm of African American equality of the one 
hand, and the absence of a norm of Latino equality on the other. The trends suggest that, 
when white voters assess their racial attitudes toward African Americans, there is more of 
a truly ambivalent range of positive and negative assessments embedded in their racial 
schema from when expressing an attitude.  
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These opposing trends for anti-Black and anti-Latino appeals become even more 
pronounced when we consider the responses for high- and low-resenters across all 
treatments. The results for the treatment effects conditioned on racial resentment help 
articulate a key finding regarding the impact of individual racial attitudes that are 
grounded in varying degrees of ambivalence within the African American and Latino 
racial schemas. Among the set of Black conditions, both high- and low- resentment 
respondents continued to disavow the explicit campaign appeals and depress their 
favorability scores relative to the control, though the low-resenters demonstrate a greater 
sense of displeasure with the appeals than their high-resentment counterparts. The results 
suggest that high- and low-resenters are both attentive to the norms environment in which 
they are asked to respond. In today’s “most racial” communications environment, when a 
candidate signals anti-Black considerations in an explicit form, high- and low-resenters 
understand the racial content of the appeal and adhere to the norm of African American 
equality by distancing themselves from the sponsoring candidate. Low-resentment 
respondents also appeared to understand the racial content of implicit-Black appeals and 
depressed their candidate favorability ratings with near statistical significance as if they 
were explicit appeals. The null results for when the anti-Black appeal is more ambiguous, 
do not advance an understanding of whether conscious or unconscious mechanisms are at 
play. The results do not help distinguish whether ambiguous appeals pass as normatively 
acceptable or possesses a sufficient degree of plausible deniability to circumvent the 
psychological control mechanisms that awareness of the norm of African American 
equality would otherwise bring to bear on the expression of respondent opinion. 
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The pattern for high- and low-resentment respondents across the Latino 
conditions is similar in that low-resentment respondents lagged their high-resentment 
counterparts in showing support for a candidate who is making a racial appeal in any 
form. The consistent, and significant, gap in the mean candidate evaluations given by 
high- and low-resentment respondents suggests that both groups perceive the Latino 
candidate appeals through a racial lens and that high-resentment respondents express 
favorability ratings that are more than one-third the feeling thermometer scale greater 
than low-resentment respondents. Though, the null results among the Latino conditions 
suggest that variations in the form and content of the Latino appeals have no impact on 
candidate favorability scores registered by each group. Following my theory of PFP, the 
null results imply that there is less ambivalence in the range of assessments that make up 
a Latino schema. The lack of ambivalence contributes to more normatively negative 
attitudes and racial appeal content fails to activate normative egalitarian considerations. 
Each Latino appeal variation failed to mobilize respondents in a measurable way.  
I view these results as support for Tesler’s (2016) argument that in a post-Obama 
America there are in fact two sides of racialization. The hyper-racial communications 
environment makes it easier to discern racial content in even veiled appeals (Reny et al. 
2019). The mass public may have grown familiar with racial code words and even the 
mechanics of racial dog whistles more generally. As a result, we see on the one hand that 
low-resenters more aggressively disavow racial content, even in coded forms, while on 
the other hand high-resenters may feel less encumbered in expressing their negative racial 
attitudes. The upshot is that among Black appeals, for which the norm of racial equality 
has been consistently communicated by elites and embraced by a majority of Americans 
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over the past half century, the norm is resilient and a sufficient deterrent to the expression 
of negative Black attitudes—even in the face of elite signaling that the norm of African 
American equality may be waning. However, the lack of treatment effects among high- 
and low-resenters in the Latino condition suggest that a norm of Latino equality has not 





CONDITIONAL EFFECTS: COMPARING THE IMPACTS OF CANDIDATE AND 
VOTER PARTISANSHIP ON RACIAL MESSAGE RECEPTION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Thus far, I have explored whether the form and content of anti-Black and anti-
Latino appeals have the same impact on white voters and whether the effects of those 
appeals are conditioned by racial resentment. In Chapter Three, I laid out the basic 
research design of my survey experiment in order to compare the impacts of implicit and 
explicit, Black, and Latino, appeals on white voters’ candidate favorability ratings. I 
demonstrated that the Implicit-Explicit model is relevant for explaining white Americans’ 
responses to anti-Black appeals in contemporary campaigns. Explicit-Black appeals 
continue to be disavowed by white voters and result in decreased candidate favorability 
ratings. Though, the same cannot be said for explicit-Latino appeals. My results show 
that explicit-Latino appeals do not depress candidate favorability and therefore cannot be 
explained by the IE model. Furthermore, the effect sizes for implicit- and explicit-Latino 
appeals are nearly indistinguishable and lack statistical significance. These results lend 
support to my theory of Permanent Foreigner Positionality as they suggest that the 
egalitarian norms that guide the perception and reception of anti-Black appeals do not 
extend to anti-Latino appeals. 
In Chapter Four I broadened this foundational research design by adding a tacit 
appeals condition. Tacit appeals allow for an examination of whether subtler rhetorical 
content would impact the perceived “implicitness” or ambiguity of a racial appeal and 
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subsequent opinion formation. For both anti-Black and anti-Latino campaign messages, I 
found that tacit appeals which seek to prime racial considerations with images alone are 
no more effective than implicit appeals. Additionally, I explored whether variations in 
individually held notions of racial ambivalence measured by racial resentment 
conditioned the treatment effects. I found that high-resentment respondents consistently 
and significantly evaluated the candidate sponsoring the racial campaign appeals more 
favorably than their low-resentment counterparts across all conditions.  
 In this chapter, I look more closely at partisan effects on racial message 
perception and reception. Partisan identity has long been argued as an enduring, affective 
attachment that individuals have to their political party and its constitutive elements 
(Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960). As a result, it serves as both a heuristic 
which helps voters organize their thoughts about the political world as well as a 
perceptive filter that influences political opinion-formation and decision-making (Bartels 
2000; Campbell et al. 1960; Goren 2005; Sniderman 2000; Zaller 1992). However, this 
notion of party influence stands in contrast to racial priming theory that expects that 
explicit appeals will be universally disavowed (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, 
and White 2002; Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin 2010). It is not clear then whether the 
influence of party identification will supplant widely held egalitarian norms about race, 
or vice-versa. 
 My findings regarding the conditional effects of partisanship on racial message 
reception point to the ways in which the IE model must be grounded in the contemporary 
political context. The move to consider the contemporary political environment is 
necessary for the IE model to continue to hold relevance for anti-Black and anti-Latino 
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appeals. The hyper-racialized and hyper-partisan nature of contemporary politics has 
significant implications for how electoral incentives regarding race and racialized issues 
are structured across party lines. The disparate race issue platforms and electoral 
coalitions that make up the Republican and Democratic parties have led to partisan-based 
variations in the normative constraints on the expression on anti-Black and anti-Latino 
attitudes. As a result, I find that the “end of racial priming” (Valentino et al. 2018) may 
have been reached for Republican candidates using racial appeals. Neither Republican 
nor Democrat voters appear particularly moved by Republican candidates who use 
explicit racial rhetoric. I find that Republican voters consistently place party attachments 
above the normative considerations of racial egalitarianism and fail to disavow explicitly 
racist Republican appeals. Democratic voters, who very strongly disavow explicit, anti-
Black appeals when the candidate is a Democrat, do not disavow Republican candidates 
leveraging the same racist appeal. In other words, only Democratic candidates suffer 
electorally for their normative commitment to racial egalitarianism. Today, explicit racist 
rhetoric appears to be an electoral liability only for Democratic candidates and not their 
Republican counterparts. 
 
THE FORGOTTEN PARTISAN ROOTS OF RACIAL PRIMING THEORY 
Since Mendelberg’s seminal work on the Implicit Explicit model in The Race 
Card (2001), an entire subfield of literature has developed in around racial priming 
theory (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002; Hurwitz and Peffley 
2005; White 2007; Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin 2010; McIlwain and Caliendo 
2011; Mendelberg and Tokeshi 2015; Nteta, Lisi, and Tarsi 2016; Valentino, Neuner, and 
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Vanderbroek 2018; Reny, Valenzuela, and Collingwood 2019; see also Chapter 3). The 
central argument of this literature states that since the Civil Rights Era, the power of the 
norm of racial equality has grown to an extent that precludes candidates from mobilizing 
white voters with explicitly racial appeals as they are perceived as violations of that norm 
(Kinder and Sanders 1996; Schuman et al. 1997; Mendelberg 2001). However, electoral 
incentives persist for candidates who can mobilize white voters’ anti-Black affect with 
implicit messages. Implicit messages are successful when the racial content is concealed 
or at least seems incidental to the campaign appeal (Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, 
Hutchings, and White 2002; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005; White 2007). Assuming the 
ubiquity of the norm of racial equality, the racial priming literature presents the IE model 
as a universal theory that can be applied to candidate appeals across the political 
spectrum in the post-Civil Rights United States. 
Among this extensive body of work, very few studies have explored the partisan 
nature of racial appeals (exceptions include Mendelberg and Tokeshi 2015; Nteta, Lisi, 
and Tarsi 2016). The lack of interest in partisanship is especially curious given that a key 
contribution of the IE model is that racial rhetorical strategies are the byproducts of racial 
norms intersecting with a party system that is aligned along the issue of race 
(Mendelberg 2001, 6). Throughout the early chapters of The Race Card, Mendelberg 
gives a meticulous historical account of changing norms and party cleavages from the 
Antebellum Era to the late 1990’s that articulate the ways that rhetorical strategies are 
context dependent (Mendelberg 2001, Chapters Two and Three). In these chapters, 
Mendelberg emphasizes that implicit and explicit racial rhetoric are not merely artifacts 
of racially liberal or racially conservative positions. Rather, she argues that rhetorical 
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strategies are decided by the socially normative and partisan contexts surrounding race in 
which party positions may (or may not) be communicated. When there are electoral 
incentives tied to mobilizing white voters on the issue of race, explicitly racist appeals are 
successful under a norm of racial inequality. However, if the norm is racial equality, then 
explicit appeals will appear as violations of that norm, and implicit appeals will become 
the vehicle through which racial positions are effectively communicated. 
Over the last two decades the literature on racial priming has been predicated 
upon the axiom of racial “ambivalence.” Ambivalence is defined as the tension that 
results from the juxtaposition of egalitarianism racial norms with continued negative 
racial stereotyping and is what makes it possible for implicit appeals to remain effective 
mobilizers of white vote choice and political opinions (see Chapter 4). The literature’s 
focus on racial ambivalence as the psychological foundation underpinning the 
effectiveness of coded appeals rests upon several assumptions regarding the ubiquity and 
stability of social norms and party positions/coalitions since the Civil Rights Era. In 
doing so, the literature neglects to acknowledge the ways in which social norms and party 
cleavages can change over time altering electoral incentives and rhetorical strategies as a 
result. The focus on racial ambivalence has led to a universal application of the IE model 
when studying racial appeals to white voters across the political spectrum. With this 
focus, the priming literature has neglected to account for the ways that norms erode and 





PARTISAN MOTIVATED REASONING 
In recent years, the United States has witnessed increased partisan polarization 
(Tesler 2016) and in light of what appears to be an increase in explicit racist rhetoric in 
campaigns for national office, including the presidential campaigns of Donald Trump, 
some scholars have questioned whether the norm of racial equality has been pushed into 
retrenchment (Valentino et al 2018; Reny et al 2019). Given the recent changes in party 
polarization and racial norms, I take up an exploration of the partisan nature of 
contemporary racial appeals in order to better understand the IE model in this hyper-
partisan and racialized political context. As noted above, the IE model states that when 
electoral incentives are present for mobilizing white voters with racial appeals and the 
norm of racial equality is sufficiently strong, racial appeals are driven into an implicit 
form in order to avoid accusations of racism. However, embedded in this model is an 
assumption that the norm of racial equality is ubiquitous and that both parties adhere 
equally to that norm. The model assumes that the electoral incentives surrounding racial 
appeal and for adhering to the norm of racial equality are identical across the two major 
parties. The IE model cannot serve as a universal theory of racial priming if the parties, 
their candidates and/or their voters in the electorate have different commitments to 
egalitarian racial norms. 
As race has been a key issue for defining party cleavages in US politics since its 
founding, the parties—and therefore their members in the electorate—have organized 
themselves around competing notions of race and their contrasting messages about the 
role of race in politics and policymaking (Frymer 2005, 2010; Kinder and Sanders 1996; 
Petrocik 1989; Sundquist 1983). Given the divisiveness of race in the United States, the 
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universal application of the IE model to candidate appeals across the political spectrum 
runs counter to the central claim of elite opinion theory (Carmines and Stimson 1992; 
Page and Shapiro 1992; Zaller 1992). According to elite opinion theory, members of the 
mass public form their political opinions in relation to the discussions, opinions, and 
debates taking place among political elites. When elite discourse presents a unified 
message, public opinion reflects that uniformity. However, when political elites are 
divided and espouse conflicting positions on an issue, politically aware members of the 
public will reflect the political opinions and behaviors of the elites who represent their 
partisan attachments. 
The conclusion that partisanship can influence individual opinions and behavior is 
in line with much of the literature on the origins and operation of partisan identity 
(Campbell et al. 1960; Miller and Shanks 1996; Green, Palmquist, and Shickler 2002). 
The dominant perspective of party identification is that it is an enduring, affective 
attachment that is developed early in life and reflects an individual’s key social group 
memberships (Campbell et al 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). It serves as 
both a heuristic, or information shortcut, that helps partisans make decisions about the 
political world more efficiently (Downs 1957; Mondak 1993; Popkin 1991; Sniderman, 
Brody, and Tetlock 1991). It also serves as a perceptual screen that conditions and colors 
the way partisans take in and interpret new political information in order to reduce 
cognitive dissonance (Campbell et al 1960; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012; 
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).  
Along these lines, more recent literature on Partisan Motivated Reasoning (PMR) 
examines the ways in which partisanship biases political evaluations and creates a tension 
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between an individual’s partisan attachments and their political values or substantive 
policy goals (Taber and Lodge 2006; Arceneaux 2008; Goren, Frederico, and Kittilson 
2009; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012; Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2013; 
Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Leeper and Slothus 2014). These studies find 
that competing partisan messages impact the magnitude and direction of the expression of 
individual political opinions. Political messages from co-partisan elites (those who share 
a partisan identity with respondents) are more influential than the same message 
communicated by elites from the opposing party (cross-partisans), even when the 
messages do not reflect traditional party positions (Petrocik 1996; Cohen 2003; Slothuus 
and de Vreese 2010). Furthermore, these studies conclude that individuals with stronger 
partisan attachments respond more favorably to co-partisan cues than their weakly-
attached counterparts (Redlawsk 2002; Taber and Lodge 2006; Goren, Frederico, and 
Kittilson 2009; Druckman, Fein, and Leeper 2012). 
In examining racial priming theory in contrast to partisan motivated reasoning, I 
extend the debate about the extent to which values and principles shape individual 
political opinions in the face of partisan cues and influence. An examination of these 
competing theories has been taken up previously by Nteta, Lisi, and Tarsi (2015). 
Though, that particular research design suffers from the same sort of methodological 
limitations I noted in Chapter Three, principally that that racial appeal is mediated by 
partisan elites who communicate their interpretations of the racial appeal for respondents. 
Nteta and colleagues’ (2015) work is a worthwhile test of Mendelberg’s (2001) assertion 
that implicit appeals are neutralized when their racial content is exposed and laid bare by 
political elites with varying party affiliations. This present study however, is squarely 
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 As noted above, this chapter seeks to adjudicate between two competing theories 
regarding the reception of candidate appeals on race—the Implicit-Explicit model and 
Partisan Motivated Reasoning. In doing so, I developed several hypotheses related to the 
impact of partisanship on the reception of racial appeals. First, I examine the specific 
impact of explicit-Black appeals on candidate favorability scores. Mendelberg’s (2001) 
IE model emphasizes that racial norms prevent candidates from making explicit racial 
appeals and those candidates who violate the norm are in turn punished by the electorate. 
Given the ubiquity of the “racial norm of equality,” the first hypothesis for this chapter 
claims that exposure to explicit appeals (both Black and Latino) will depress candidate 
favorability relative to the control regardless of respondent partisanship (H5.1). However, 
over the past few chapters I have expressed my skepticism over the even application of 
the “norm of racial equality” on explicit appeals that negatively target different racial 
groups. Under my theory of Permanent Foreigner Positionality (PFP) I differentiated 
between a norm of “African American” equality and Mendelberg’s more universal norm 
of “racial” equality to argue that explicit-Latino appeals will not be disavowed in the 
same way as explicit-Black appeals. As such, the second set of hypotheses states that 
while exposure to partisan explicit-Black appeals will depress candidate favorability 
(H5.2a), exposure to partisan explicit-Latino appeals will not depress candidate 
favorability relative to the control regardless of respondent partisanship (H5.2b). 
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Although Partisan Motivated Reasoning is silent on racial appeals in particular, 
the theory claims that a co-partisan appeal is more influential than a cross-partisan 
appeal. Applying the logic of PMR to racial appeals, I hypothesize that Democratic 
voters will respond with higher candidate favorability when exposed to Democratic 
appeals compared to Republican appeals, even when the appeal is explicitly racial 
(H5.3a). Likewise, Republicans will respond with higher candidate favorability to 
Republican appeals compared to Democratic appeals, even when the appeal is explicitly 
racial. In this way, PMR and the IE model stand in opposition to one another in regard to 
the impact of explicit, partisan appeals. The design of my survey experiment allows for a 
direct test of whether partisan motivation or racial norms will dominate racial message 
reception and the expression of political opinions. 
Finally, Partisan Motivated Reasoning also posits that individuals with stronger 
party attachments will respond more affirmatively to co-partisan appeals than those 
individuals with weaker partisan identities. Thus, the hypotheses derived from this 
subgroup focus within the literature state that strong Democrats, relative to weak 
Democrats, exposed to co-partisan racial appeals will rate the Democratic candidate more 
favorably (H5.4a) and that strong Republicans will respond to co-partisan appeals with 
higher candidate favorably ratings than their weak Republican counterparts (H5.4b). 
 
DESIGN 
Recall from Chapters Three and Four that respondents who participated in my 
2016 CCES survey module were randomly assigned to one of seven different conditions 
(N=1,973): Black-explicit, Black-implicit, Black-tacit, Latino-explicit, Latino-implicit, 
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Latino-tacit, or the control (see Table 4.1). In each condition, the fictitious congressman’s 
partisanship was randomized with a visual-text preamble that appeared on the computer 
screen prior to the presentation of the experimental mailer images. The preamble read: 
“On the next page, you will see some campaign materials from Democratic [Republican] 
Congressman, Don Williams that will be followed by a short set of questions. Please take 
your time to look over each of the campaign mailers carefully.”  
Following the preamble message, all respondents viewed the same “Election 
Day” mailer as described in the full experiment and were then exposed to one of the 
seven “Voter ID” mailer conditions (Table 4.1). Exposure to the mailer treatments was 
followed by a post-treatment questionnaire that included candidate favorability as the 
dependent variable of interest, measured with a feeling thermometer (0-100 scale in 
which higher values reflect “warmer,” more supportive positions). The randomization of 
candidate partisanship allows for an examination of the impact that co-and cross-partisan 




The data from 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) captured 
respondent demographics in the common-content, first wave (N=3,520) of the dual wave 
panel. For the following analyses, I used a 7-point Likert, party identification question 
that ask respondents to identify themselves as one of the following: Strong Democrat, 
Weak Democrat, Lean Democrat, Independent, Lean Republican, Weak Republican, and 
Strong Republican. For my initial analyses, which compared the responses of Democrats 
115
and Republican voters, I eliminated the respondents who self-identified as Independents 
and created a dummy variable for partisanship that included all respondents who self-
identified as either Republican or Democrats, regardless of partisan strength. For later 
analyses that are interested in the effect of partisan strength on racial message reception, I 
created two other dummy variables that distinguished between strong and weak/leaning 
partisans (strong-weak/leaning Democrats and strong-weak/leaning Republicans). 
 
RESULTS 
This chapter examines several hypotheses regarding the ways that partisanship 
influences the reception of racial messages and impacts candidate favorability. In testing 
the hypotheses related to the impact of explicit racial appeals derived from the IE model 
(Mendelberg 2001) and my theory of Permanent Foreigner Positionality, I first estimated 
two regression models. These models examine the impact of explicit-, implicit-, and tacit-
Black and Latino appeals on Democratic and Republican respondents’ candidate 
favorability scores (Figure 5.1). Recall from above that the experimental design fully 
randomized candidate partisanship. This allowed for a basic examination of whether 
partisan voters respond differently to the form and content of racial campaign appeals 
apart from the influence that candidate partisanship may have on message reception and 
acceptance. 
Considering first the hypothesis derived from IE model (H5.1) that explicit 
appeals will depress candidate favorability relative to the control, I find partial support 
among Democrats exposed to the explicit-Black treatment. Only Democratic respondents 
strongly disavow the explicit-Black appeal and distance themselves from the candidate 
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with depressed favorability scores (-11-points, p =.002) compared to Democratic 
respondents in the control. Republican respondents also generate depressed favorability 
scores in the explicit-Black condition compared to Republican respondents in the control, 
though the depressed scores are not statistically significant.  
 
Figure 5.1: OLS Regression Coefficients for Democratic and Republican 





The results for the explicit-Latino appeal also fail to support H5.1 as neither 
Republican nor Democratic respondents depress their candidate favorability ratings in the 
face of explicitly anti-Latino appeals. Democratic respondents’ candidate favorability 
ratings are not significant compared to Democrats in the control. Yet, fully contrary to the 
IE model, I find that the explicit-Latino treatment has a positive and statistically 
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significant impact on the candidate favorability ratings of Republican voters (6 points, p= 
.043) relative to Republicans in the control. The boost in candidate favorability among 
Republican voters exposed to an explicit-Latino appeal, along with the failure of that 
explicit appeal to significantly depress favorability among Democratic voters, offers 
support for H5.2 derived from my theory of Permanent Foreigner Positionality. The norm 
of racial equality fails to present a constraint on white political opinion regarding 
normatively anti-Latino positions. 
The regression coefficients in Figure 5.1 demonstrate disparate treatment effects 
for the ways that partisans respond to explicit -Black and -Latino appeals when candidate 
partisanship is randomized. However, because the coefficient outputs for Republican and 
Democratic voters are relative to their partisan counterparts in the control, the plots do 
not articulate the magnitude of difference between Republican and Democratic voters in 
the same condition. I generated a plot of predicted outcomes with 95% confidence 
intervals (Figure 5.2) to show the highly disparate mean favorability scores partisan 
voters registered for Congressman Williams (candidate partisanship randomized) across 
all treatments, including the control. These results clearly demonstrate that partisan voters 
view the candidate and/or the Voter ID issue very differently and their favorability scores 
were generally unaffected by variations in the treatment appeals with the exception of the 
explicit appeals noted above. Similar to the results for racial resentment presented in 
Chapter Four, the results here suggest that the Voter ID issue may be racialized and that 
as a result, support for the issue and sponsoring candidate tracks along a partisan 
cleavage. Democratic voters consistently registered lower candidate favorability scores 





Figure 5.2: Predictive Outcomes Plot for Democratic and Republican Voters’ 




Next, in order to assess whether candidate partisanship has a conditional effect 
on racial message reception in the broadest terms, I estimated a regression model that 
examines the impacts of appeals from either a Republican or Democratic Congressman 
Williams on respondents’ candidate favorability (Figure 5.3). Interestingly, candidate 
partisan effects are similar, yet even more pronounced than the results above for the 
explicit-Black and explicit-Latino conditions disaggregated by respondent partisanship. I 
found null results for all partisan candidate conditions except for explicit-Black appeals 
made by Democrat Williams (-14-points, p < .001) and explicit-Latino appeals made by 
Republican Williams (8-points, p=.029). Which is to say that while Democratic 
119
candidates are significantly punished for making an explicit-Black appeal relative to 
Democratic appeals in the control, the Republican candidates are tolerated when they 
make the same explicit-Black appeal relative to the Republican control. Furthermore, 
Democratic candidates see no statistically significant gain in favorability when they move 
from the control to an explicit-Latino appeal while Republican candidates benefit 
significantly. It is worth highlighting that these results indicate that only Democratic 
candidates are electorally constrained by the norm of African American equality. 
 
Figure 5.3: Coefficient Plot for Candidate Favorability Among All Voters for 






Next, I estimated several additional regression models examining the impact of 
co- and cross-partisan racial appeals on Democratic and Republican respondents’ 
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candidate favorability scores (Figure 5.4). Among the sets of regression outputs for co- 
and cross-partisan appeals, represented in Figure 5.4, only the combination of Democratic 
appeals on Democratic voters yielded significant results relative to the control. These 
results offer support for H5.1. Democratic voters depress favorability scores -17-points 
(p= .001) for Democratic candidates making an explicit-Black appeal. This is a 
particularly significant finding given the already low baseline candidate favorability 
scores that Democratic voters register for candidates discussing the voter identification 
laws as a campaign issue (compared to the Republic baseline; Figure 5.2).  
 
Figure 5.4: OLS Regression Coefficients for Co- and Cross-Partisan Candidate 





The unique impact of co-partisan, explicit-Black appeals on Democratic voters is 
an interesting finding for several reasons. First, since candidate campaigns typically work 
to reach co-partisans and independent voters in the electorate, these results likely have a 
high degree of external validity. Voters may not be exposed, or pay attention to, cross-
partisan appeals in a manner that impacts their candidate evaluations. Second, these 
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results show that Democratic voters only sanction or “punish” co-partisan candidates. 
This suggests Democratic voters believe that either they only have the ability to make an 
impact on the Democratic candidate, or that they expect Republican candidates to peddle 
racial appeals which does not impact their evaluation of the candidate who makes such an 
appeal, or perhaps both. Finally, Republican voters do not significantly alter their 
evaluations of either Republican or Democratic candidates making racial appeals. This 
suggests that Republican voters accept—or, at least, are unfazed by—the use of racial 
appeals in any form. 
By consolidating the results above and focusing on the results for explicit-Black 
and –Latino appeals, I can also demonstrate that there is a good deal of support for H5.2 
and my theory of Permanent Foreigner Positionality. There are significant gains in 
candidate favorability when a candidate exchanges an explicit-Black appeal for an 
explicit-Latino appeal in every combination of partisan of voters and candidates, except 
among those Republican voters receiving a co-partisan appeal. The null result for the co-
partisan Republican appeals may be an artifact of the weak disavowal of the explicit-
Black appeal which appears to be driving the difference in the other pairs. Or the null 
result may be a false negative due to a drop in statistical power due to extending the N in 
my dataset to subset analyses for co- and cross-partisan appeals involving Republicans. 
Regardless, the increase in favorability, along with an absence of sanctions for candidates 
making explicit, anti-Latino appeals suggests that both Democratic and Republican voters 
find it normatively more acceptable to target Latino citizens with explicit racist rhetoric 
than they do Blacks. 
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Figure 5.5: Predicted Outcomes Plots for Candidate Favorability Conditioned on 





Turning to the next set of hypotheses derived from the theory of Partisan 
Motivated Reasoning (H5.3), the predicted outcomes plots in Figure 5.5 best articulate 
the differential impacts of co- and cross-partisan appeals on Republican and Democratic 
voters in each condition. The left side of Figure 5.5 shows Republican voters’ mean 
favorability ratings when exposed to co- and cross-partisan appeals across all conditions. 
The margins plot for Republican respondents clearly demonstrates support for H5.3: co-
partisan appeals better mobilize candidate support than cross-partisan appeals. 
Republican voters are highly responsive to co-partisan appeals. Within each condition, 
Republican candidate appeals generate higher favorability ratings than the same appeals 
made by a Democratic candidate. The deltas between the co- and cross-partisan appeals 
in every condition (save for Black-tacit) are all statistically significant according to two-
tailed tests of significance (see Table A5.1 in the Appendix). Though it should again be 
noted that the statistical power for the analyses for co- and cross-partisan appeals to 
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Republican voters is very weak. Low statistical power may conceal the magnitude of 
impact between the two different appeals. 
On the right side of Figure 5.5 we can see that the predicted outcomes plot for 
Democrats receiving co-partisan appeals tells a very different story. Unlike Republican 
voters who consistently respond more favorably to co-partisan appeals across all 
conditions, I find very limited support for H5.3 among Democrats in that they only 
respond more favorably to co-partisan appeals in the tacit-Black condition. The tacit-
Black condition was composed of the most subtle message composition targeting Blacks 
with racial imagery alone; the rhetorical reference in the tacit appeal is race-neutral. A 
two-tailed test of significance shows Democrats are 18-points (p=.001) more favorable 
toward a Democratic, tacit-Black appeal compared to the cross-partisan appeals in the 
same condition (see Table A5.2 in the Appendix).  
This is a unique and important finding as it highlights my Chapter Four 
hypotheses regarding the perceived ambiguity of tacit appeals. While Democrats are 
highly punitive toward co-partisan candidates when they make explicit-Black appeals, we 
can see that Democratic voters are willing to abandon the norm of African American 
equality and mobilize support for co-partisans making highly coded, tacit-Black appeals. 
It may be taken as evidence in support of my claim regarding the ambiguity required for a 
coded appeal to be successful in the hyper-partisan and -racialized information 
environment in which contemporary campaigns take place. Given the two parties’ 
divergent positions on issues of race, it may be that Democratic voters trust their co-
partisan candidates to an extent that allows the race-neutral language of the tacit appeal to 
pass as only “coincidental.” Similarly, the “plausible deniability” of the tacit appeal may 
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offer respondents enough cover to relax their otherwise vigilant monitoring of racial 
rhetoric in relation to African American egalitarian norms. 
 
Figure 5.6: OLS Regression Coefficients for Co- and Cross-Partisan Appeals Pooled 




Still, I am cautious to not overinterpret the null results given the very small effect 
sizes found using Cohen's (1988) criteria. The results do not provide much clarity for the 
conditions in which there are no significant differences between the co- and cross-
partisan favorability ratings among Democratic voters. While the randomizations built 
into my experimental design allow for subgroup analyses of very discrete partisan 
interactions, it also requires I substantially cut down the sample size to where the power 
generally falls below 0.50 in the conditions with null results (see Appendix A5.2). Low 
statistical power increases the probability of making a Type II error which suggests that 
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the null results may include multiple false negatives. False negatives due to small 
statistical power could mean that Democratic voters may very well be significantly more 
responsive to co-partisan appeals in more than just the tacit-Black condition.  
In order to retain large statistical power, I pooled the data across conditions in 
order to make a generalized assessment of co- vs. cross-partisan racial appeals for 
Democratic voters. Given the theoretically and empirically unique outcomes of the 
explicit-Black condition documented in the preceding analyses, I pooled together the 
results for all co-partisan appeals and then all cross-partisan appeals to Democrats, 
excluding the explicit-Black condition in each pool. Figure 5.6 shows that pooled co-
partisan appeals to Democrats (excluding the explicit-Black condition) yield candidate 
favorability scores that are 7-points (p <.001) greater than pooled, cross-partisan appeals 
(excluding the explicit-Black condition) and very large statistical power at .90. I find that 
outside of explicit-Black appeals, the impact of pooled co-partisan Democratic appeals is 
on par with that of pooled co-partisan Republican appeals (9-points, p < .001; Figure 
5.6). This suggests that partisan attachments trump the normative considerations of racial 
egalitarianism for both Republicans and Democrats and lends overall support for Partisan 
Motivated Reasoning (H5.3) even in the face of racial appeals, excepting those that 
explicitly target Blacks. 
Finally, I tested the subgroup hypothesis rooted in Partisan Motivated Reasoning. 
Here, PMR states that strong partisans are more strongly influenced by co-partisan 
appeals than their weak partisan counterparts (H5.4). A predicted outcomes plot clearly 
articulates the substantive differences in candidate favorability ratings among co-partisan 
with strong, and weak, attachment to their party (Figure 5.7). One important finding to 
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note between the two plots is that strong Republicans and strong Democrats behave quite 
differently when exposed to racial appeals from their respective co-partisan candidates. 
Strong Republicans are more consistently favorable toward their co-partisan candidate 
compared to their weak Republican counterparts, though only significantly more so in the 
tacit-Black condition (14-points, p=.022). Contrastingly, strong Democrats demonstrated 
a greater sensitivity to the message construction of racial appeals and exhibited greater 
variability in their favorability assessments of co-partisan candidates. Compared to their 
weak Democrat counterparts, strong Democrats were significantly more punitive toward 
co-partisan candidates making either explicit-Black (-19-points, p=.003) or implicit-
Latino (-16-points, p=.033) racial appeals. 
 
Figure 5.7: Predicted Outcomes Plots for Candidate Favorability Conditioned on 
Strong and Weak Partisans Receiving Co-Partisan Appeals Across All Conditions 




However, in order to examine the impacts of co-partisan racial appeals, the 
dataset was even more cut down, further diminishing its statistical power. Statistical 
power only reached a medium range (0.57- 0.78) for the conditions in which two-tailed 
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tests of significance yielded significant results for the favorability scores of strong and 
weak co-partisans (Republican tacit-Black, Democrat explicit-Black, and Democrat 
implicit-Latino). A pooled analysis which compared the effects of racial appeals on 
strong and weak partisans unfortunately did not sufficiently increase statistical power to a 
level where effect sizes (0.27 for pooled, strong and weak Democrats and 0.59 for 
pooled, strong and weak Republicans) are meaningful inferences regarding whether 
Partisan Motivated Reasoning differentially influences racial message reception among 
these discrete partisan subgroups. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 The results above demonstrate partisan differences in candidate evaluations when 
white voters are exposed to racial appeals. While PMR accounts for the direction of the 
majority of respondent movement across most conditions, there are unique partisan 
effects for candidates who engage in explicit-anti-Black appeals. Both Republican and 
Democratic voters dole out significantly harsh punishments to Democratic candidates 
leveraging explicit anti-Black appeals. Additionally, even in an era of “negative 
partisanship” (Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018; Iyengar and Westwood 2015) Democrats in 
the electorate punished their own party’s candidate more harshly than they would 
Republican candidates making the same explicit-Black appeal. My work highlights the 
often overlooked “two sides of racialization” contribution from Tesler’s Post-Racial or 
Most-Racial: Race and Politics in the Obama Era (2016). The discussion of Tesler’s 
widely received text tends to emphasize the anti-Black affect which emerged following 
the Obama presidency, neglecting the corresponding increase in racial liberalism that 
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developed alongside racial conservativism. In this chapter, we could clearly see the 
incongruous impact of racial rhetoric on Republican and Democratic candidate 
evaluations. Racial egalitarianism would appear to have become the exclusive 
responsibility of the race-conscious members of our society on the political left, while the 
political right seems to have reached the “end of racial priming.” 
When candidate partisanship is randomized, Republican and Democratic voters 
had disparate candidate favorability ratings of Congressman Williams across all racial 
appeal variations. The favorability ratings trend higher—and somewhat more 
consistently—among Republican voters than Democrats (Figure 5.2). This finding is 
consistent with recent literature by Gronke and colleagues (2019) which demonstrates 
that Republican support for voter identification laws is more unified and reflects party 
consensus, whereas Democratic support for the reform is more variable owing to the 
party’s heterogeneous membership. Given that the racial appeals in this survey 
experiment are communicated through issue campaign mailers on voter ID laws, it is 
possible that the disparate favorability ratings reflect, in part, the partisan polarization on 
the voter ID laws as well as on the issue of race. 
 When candidate favorability ratings are disaggregated by candidate partisanship, 
co-partisan appeals prove to be more persuasive than cross-partisan appeals (Figures 5.5 
and 5.6). There is strong evidence in support of Partisan Motivated Reasoning for 
candidate evaluations in the face of racial appeals. Republican voters consistently and 
significantly evaluate co-partisan candidates more favorably than cross-partisans making 
the same racial appeal. Democratic voters demonstrate more variable favorability scores 
for co-partisan racial appeals across conditions. Though in the aggregate, co-partisan 
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appeals (outside of the explicit-Black condition) prove to be significantly more 
persuasive than cross-partisan appeals. Overall, Republican would voters appear more 
disposed to Partisan Motivated Reasoning. In contrast, Democratic voters appear less 
susceptible to PMR in the voter identification issue domain, except in the most subtle, 
tacit-Black condition which elicited a significant positive response for candidate 
favorability. Democrats in the electorate also very strongly disavowed the explicit-Black 
appeal, punishing the sponsored co-partisan candidate. At least for Democratic voters, 
then, adhering to the norm of African American equality appears to outweigh the 
motivation to align with their party’s candidate.  
I find significant negative effects with large statistical power for the explicit-
Black appeal among Democratic voters. Though, it is important to note that the null 
results for many of the difference of mean tests may be false negatives due to the small 
statistical power of the subset samples. Which is to say that my results are inconclusive 
with respect to impact of multiple treatment effects of interest, namely explicit-Black 
appeals on Republican voters. It is also unclear whether partisanship influences the 
reception of explicit, anti-Latino messages. Despite securing a large, nationally 
representative sample for this study, the respondents are spread over too many conditions 
to conduct discrete, partisan subgroup analyses. Future research could focus more 
exclusively on the impact of explicit racial appeals on Republican voters, as well as 
whether there are partisan differences in the reception of explicit-Latino appeals. By 
narrowing the focus, researchers could be able to limit the number of conditions, thus 
retaining the statistical power of the sample. 
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 One of the more interesting findings is that candidate partisanship seems to drive 
racial message reception (Figure 5.3). Democratic candidates consistently suffer 
depressed favorability ratings when they deliver an explicit-Black appeal, while 
Republican candidates are not punished significantly by either Republicans or Democrats 
in the electorate. It’s possible then that the candidate favorability rating may be, in part, 
artifacts of partisan issue ownership (Petrocik 1996) and the partisan polarization on 
voter identification laws (Gronke et al. 2019) and/or issues of race (Tesler 2016).  
According to Petrocik’s (1996) theory of issue ownership, voters support candidates with 
better issue-handling reputations. Since the early 2000’s, the Republican Party has 
promoted stricter voter ID requirements to ensure the integrity of in-person voting and 
elections (Hasen 2012; Hicks, McKee and Smith 2015). While Democrats also were 
initially supportive of the reform, that support waned as the party adopted an alternate 
issue frame that focused on voter suppression as an aspect of the voter ID requirement 
(Gronke et al. 2019). Therefore, the voter ID mailer in my survey experiment which 
emphasizes electoral integrity may very well be a framing that is interpreted as a 
“Republican” issue, where Republicans have a “better” issue-handling reputation. This 
may translate to greater voter confidence and higher favorability ratings for the 
Republican Congressman Williams across treatments. 
 Likewise, research has demonstrated that voter identification laws are “racialized” 
and that support for voter ID laws increases alongside racial resentment (Wilson and 
Brewer 2013; see also Chapter 4). Tesler (2016, 155) notes that in terms of partisanship, 
there has been a growing racialization of party identification. Since the Obama 
presidency, racially liberal whites (low-racial resentment scores) increasingly identify as 
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Democrats, whereas racial conservatives (high-resentment whites) increasingly identify 
as Republican. As anti-Black affect becomes increasingly linked to Republican party 
identification, white Republicans may exhibit greater tolerance of racial appeals, even in 
its explicit forms (Valentino et al. 2018), from candidates across the political spectrum. In 
contrast, Democratic candidates are severely punished by Democrats in the electorate 
and, to a lesser degree, by Republicans as well. This finding helps to more fully articulate 
Tesler’s (2016) “two sides of racialization.” Discussions of Tesler’s widely received text 
tend to emphasize the anti-Black affect that emerged following the Obama presidency 
and overlooks the corresponding increase in racial liberalism that developed alongside 
racial conservatism. 
Strong Democrats emerged as the constituency that is most punitive toward co-
partisan candidates making an explicit-Black appeal. This finding lends support to the 
idea that both the voter identification issue and racial appeals are polarized along party 
lines. The fervent disavowal of explicitly anti-Black messages suggest that strong 
Democrats understand the appeal to be not only a violation of the norm of African 
American equality, but possibly as a violation of the Democratic Party image or platform 
as well. Strong partisans are typically more attached to and informed about the party 
platform (Redlawsk 2002; Taber and Lodge 2006; Goren, Frederico, and Kittilson 2009; 
Druckman, Fein, and Leeper 2012). Strong Democrats may be more punitive than weak 
Democrats as a means of patrolling the party label, sanctioning candidates who deviate 
from the party brand. 
Negative partisanship (Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Mason 
2015) may be able to account for the lower baseline favorability scores that cross-partisan 
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candidates receive from partisan voters. However, there is no evidence of negative 
partisanship in relation to the movement of favorability scores across racial appeal 
conditions. The results of my survey experiment clearly show that Democratic candidates 
making explicit-Black appeals are very strongly sanctioned by co-partisan Democrats in 
the electorate as well as by Republicans, though to a lesser extent. Meanwhile, 
Republican candidate favorability is not significantly impacted by an explicit-Black 
appeal. Neither Republican nor Democratic voters appear to take much issue with 
Republicans making explicit-Black appeals. If negative partisanship were at play here, 
the results would show a greater disavowal by cross-partisan voters of explicit-Black 
appeals compared to the control. Instead, we see that the negative impact on candidate 
favorability in light of an explicit-Black appeal converges upon the Democratic candidate 
by voters from both parties. Additionally, among the conditions in which there are 
significant differences between Republican and Democratic candidate favorability scores, 
those differences are most likely attributed to Partisan Motivated Reasoning (Figure 5.5). 
In those cases, the results show a positive movement of candidate evaluations (as 
opposed to a depression of evaluations) relative to the control. Negative baselines are 
generally maintained across conditions and most of the statistically significant differences 
in candidate favorability resulted from respondent exposure to co-partisan appeals. 
  These results add valuable, substantive nuance to the recent work by Valentino 
and colleagues (2018) regarding the “end of racial priming” by accounting for the “two 
sides of racialization” (Tesler 2016). It clearly articulates that the limitations of the IE 
model run along partisan lines. The differential responses to Democratic and Republican 
candidates, when making the same explicit anti-Black appeals, corroborates the central 
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claim in Valentino et al.’s (2018) work—that the United States has become more tolerant 
of explicit racial rhetoric. Yet, this work brings into relief the ways in which tolerance for 
explicit, anti-Black rhetoric is highly partisan and polarized. The lack of impact that 
explicit-Black appeals had on Republican candidate favorability suggests that explicit, 
anti-Black appeals have become tolerated by the mass public (Republican and 
Democratic voters alike) when they are delivered by Republican elites. At the same time, 
voters are severely punitive toward Democratic candidates who attempt to garner support 
with explicit-Black appeals. This polarized, partisan response to explicit-Black appeals 
may indicate that the mass public has come to expect racial conservativism and negative 
racial stereotyping from Republicans while concomitantly expecting Democrats, or those 
on the racial left, to bear the burdens of patrolling and enforcing racial egalitarianism.  
While this study does not provide direct evidence in support of or against the 
psychological mechanism undergirding the IE model, it does raise questions about the 
assumption that coded racial appeals work “unconsciously” to activate voters’ responses 
to campaign appeal content. The significant and divergent candidate favorability ratings 
which partisan voters give to co- and cross-partisan candidates across various appeal 
conditions suggests that there may be a more thoughtful decision-making process at hand 
than a mere “unconscious” reaction to racial campaign messages. The direction and 
magnitude of candidate favorability scores appears contingent on multiple contextual 
factors such as racial appeal target (Black or Latino), racial rhetoric (explicit, implicit, or 
tacit), and partisanship that are weighed and evaluated in relation to one another. The 
evidence in this study points to a level of voter sophistication that suggests voters are at 
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least conscientious—if not outright strategic—about for whom and when they are willing 
to rebuke violations of racial norms or simply look the other way. 
My findings point to the ways in which the IE model must be grounded in the 
contemporary political context in order to continue to hold theoretical relevance for both 
African American and Latino racial appeals. Theoretically, each of the axiomatic 
conditions must be met for the hypotheses of the IE model to have an applied relevance. 
A norm of equality must be sufficiently ubiquitous and robust, and voters must 
understand explicit, racist appeals as violations of that egalitarian racial norm. Finally, 
sanctions for candidates who utilize negative racist appeals must be in place. Future 
political science research would do well to define the criteria that undergird each of these 




CONCLUSION: THE NORM OF RACIAL EQUALITY AND THE BOUNDS OF THE 
IMPLICIT EXPLICIT MODEL OF RACIAL PRIMING 
 
The success with which Donald Trump deployed negative racial rhetoric in his 
2016 presidential campaign astounded and exasperated many members of the public and 
the media. Political pundits and scientists alike struggled to make sense of the apparent 
turn in both campaign strategy and public response to racial campaign appeals. 
Frustrations surfaced not only around how Trump could “get away” with using explicitly 
racist language, but there was also contention about whether his racialized language was 
altogether racist. How was it possible that the American public was so divided over the 
form and content of Trumps racist appeals? 
The growth and political salience of non-Black racial minorities in the United 
States, particularly Latinos, has raised important questions about the relevance of the 
implicit-explicit model for campaign appeals that target these groups in attempts to 
mobilize white public opinion and political behavior. Likewise, the hyper-polarized and 
hyper-racialized context in which contemporary political campaigns take place have 
challenged the assumptions embedded in our understanding of the implicit-explicit model 
of racial priming. As a result, this contemporary political context helps to elucidate 
where, when, and under what conditions the IE model has relevance and can be reliably 
applied. Therefore, far from having reached the “end of racial priming” (Valentino et al. 
2018) this study demonstrates how the theoretical assumptions in the IE model must be 
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substantiated before it is applied to a racial(ized) group and sheds lights on the boundary 
conditions embedded in the model as it is currently configured.  
 
A NORM OF AFRICAN AMERICAN EQUALITY, NOT RACIAL EQUALITY 
The foundational experiment presented in Chapter Three demonstrates that the 
implicit-explicit model of racial priming is still very much relevant for anti-Black 
appeals. When the interlocutors are randomized, explicit, anti-Black appeals continue to 
have a negative impact on the favorability ratings of the sponsoring candidate. The 
priming power of implicit Black appeals seems to be diminished in comparison to prior 
studies, or perhaps was concealed in the absence of a control condition as a baseline for 
respondent attitudes. With the control condition included in the experimental design, it 
becomes apparent that the relative success of implicit appeals may mostly be attributed to 
the drop in candidate favorability ratings among respondents exposed to an explicit 
appeal. Therefore, the effectiveness of a Black appeal’s racial content is tied more to its 
ability to mobilize anti-racist rather than racist thinking. The presence and/or strength of 
the egalitarian racial norm surrounding African Americans seems to govern the direction 
of this movement. 
To the contrary, explicit, anti-Latino appeals are not disavowed by the white 
voters in this study. Respondents exposed to explicit-Latino appeals show some positive 
movement in candidate favorability ratings, but that change does not meet standard levels 
of statistical significance. Additionally, implicit-Latino appeals are not statistically 
distinguished from either the explicit-Latino appeals or the control. This may indicate 
either that white voters do not distinguish between implicit- and explicit anti-Latino 
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content, or considering the findings for African American appeals, that a norm of Latino 
equality has yet to be developed and fortified by political elites. Given that the African 
American norm of equality seemed to be tied to negative candidate favorability ratings, it 
follows that an absence of the same negative expressions of candidate favorability is tied 
to the absence of a countervailing racial norm tied to Latino equality. 
Though it is beyond the scope of this present study it is worthwhile to understand 
whether a norm of ‘Latino (American)’ equality has yet to be established in the United 
States or if Latinos, racialized as persistent foreigners, are precluded from being 
conceptualized as equals in this context. The difference here is significant in that on the 
one hand, Mendelberg (2001) provides blueprint for how to establish and maintain a 
racial norm when look to African Americans and the formal political gains the group 
made toward establishing a norm of racial equality. The Race Card (2001) discusses the 
ways that norms may wax and wane over time and how landmark political decisions as 
well as elite rhetoric impact their movement. If on the other hand, Latinos are racialized 
with a persistent foreigner status that prevents them from making formal political gains, it 
would be more difficult to substantiate their equal treatment and establish a norm of 
equality (at least along the same path that was pursued to advance African American 
equality). Nevertheless, it is possible for new conceptualizations of citizenship or 
advances in Latino positionality to develop that could hold within them alternate 




RACIAL RESENTMENT CONTINUES TO BE SIGNIFICANT MEDIATOR OF 
POLITICAL OPINION AND BEHAVIOR 
 Earlier studies in racial priming consistently identified racial resentment as the 
main moderator of the expression of anti-Black attitudes (Huffey and Peffley 2005; 
Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). This study continues to 
support the finding that racial resentment is highly correlated with racial message 
acceptance and high candidate favorability scores. However, high- and low-racial 
resentment scores correspond with high and low candidate favorability, respectively, 
across all conditions including the control. Recent research has demonstrated that racial 
resentment is highly correlated with support for voter ID laws (Wilson and Brewer 2013, 
2016). The fact that high and low resenters are significantly distinguish even in the race-
neutral control condition suggests that the voter identification issue, at least in part, is 
driving some of the effect. 
However, racial resentment is a scale that measures positive and negative affect 
towards Blacks only. While research has demonstrated that racial resentment is a 
relatively stable predisposition associated with outgroups prejudice (Carney and Enos 
2017; Kalkan, Layman, and Uslaner 2009) and will be and correlated with anti-Latino 
attitudes, future research may make use of newly developed measures of anti-Latino 
attitudes (Ramirez & Peterson 2020). The survey experiment for this study included my 
attempt at a Latino resentment index, but as it was included in the post-test questionnaire 
alone it was inappropriate to use for the preceding analyses. 
The Latino resentment scale I developed (see Appendix C for full question 
wording) closely mirrored the ANES 4-question Likert scale battery for racial 
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resentment. Because Blacks and Latinos share many negative stereotypes relate, I could 
replace the word “Blacks” with “Latinos” and retain the integrity and relevance of most 
racial resent questions, i.e.: Over the past few years, Blacks (Latinos) have gotten less 
than they deserve. However, I could not make the same simple substitution for the racial 
resentment question that rests upon the history of generational slavery that Blacks 
experienced in this country as Latinos do not share that experience. Instead, I substituted 
“land occupation” for “slavery” to create the question: Generations of land occupation 
and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Latinos to work their 
way out of the lower class. I offer this Latino resentment scale here as a launching point 
for either scholarly critique or future research endeavors. 
Additionally, in this work I attempt to provide a link between the construction of 
racial schemas and the expression of racial resentment. As schemas are thought to contain 
the full range of affective attachments about an attitude object, it will contain a variety of 
beliefs that each possess both a valence and magnitude. If we are to methodically unpack 
the social-psychological constitution of a racial schema, then we may be able to gain 
empirical insights into not only individual racial attitudes, but also come near to a 
quantitative account of a racial norm. As I discussed in Chapter Four, all the socially 
available ideas, beliefs, and stereotypes about a racial group would make up a racial 
schema. However, the relative direction and strength that an individual gives to any of 
those idea, belief, or stereotype components would determine their racial attitude. 
For example, a Black racial schema would include popularly available ideas such 
as criminal, violent, welfare, lazy, innovative, hip hop, rap, R&B, dreadlocks, braids, 
Afro, Black Panthers, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr., W.E.B. DuBois, Black love, 
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Black Lives Matter, and so on. But it is the relative value (positive, negative, neutral) and 
weight (more important, less important) that an individual gives to any of these ideas that 
will constitute an individual racial attitude. 
Therefore, it should be possible to work backwards and ask survey respondents to 
free associate ideas or stereotypes that are associated with a particular racial group to 
arrive at a collective sense of a racial schema. This cumulative responses to this activity 
would help to demonstrate the degree to which ambivalence was embedded in the racial 
schema and potentially serve as an approximated measure for the presence and/or 
strength of a norm of equality for that racial group. The responses generated from that 
previous activity could then be used to create an index that asks a different set of 
respondents to record the extent to which they disagree or agree with those ideas and 
stereotypes which would be a recording of their individual racial attitudes. It seems both 
worthwhile and technically feasible to ask what exactly are the affective attachments that 
Americans have toward Blacks (and other racial groups) instead of using a somewhat 
arbitrarily constructed racial resentment question battery. 
 
PARTISAN BIFURCATION OF THE NORM OF AFRICAN AMERICAN EQUALIY 
This study’s ability to disaggregate the impact of co- and cross-partisan appeals 
make a unique and previously overlooked contribution to the field. My findings related to 
partisanship 1) corroborate the assumptions regarding the Republican party’s ongoing 
legacy of racial appeals, 2) identify the contextual conditions under which dog-whistle 
appeals have currency for Democratic candidates, and 3) emphasize that norms wax and 
wane over time and competing norms may exist concomitantly. 
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Since the Obama presidency, racial resentment has also been strongly correlated 
with partisanship (Tesler 2016). Racial considerations more heavily influence party 
identification than they did in the past. Issues of race have become the major fault line 
distinguishing the two major parties in the United States with more racial conservatives 
migrating to the Republican party (Lublin 2004; Valentino and Sears 2005). This study 
shows similar trends among partisanship and racial resentment in that Republicans across 
all conditions register higher candidate favorability ratings compared to Democrats. 
Recent research demonstrates a partisan divide support for voter ID laws (Gronke 
et al. 2019). While the voter ID issue enjoyed bi-partisan support in the early 2000’s, 
Democratic support for stricter voter identification policies waned during the first term of 
the Obama presidency. By 2012, longitudinal survey data could demonstrate that there 
were significant differences in partisan opinions regarding voter ID laws, but scholarly 
research documenting and confirming these trends was not available until after the survey 
experiment for this study was fielded in 2016. This is just to say that support for voter ID 
laws was not as universal as I originally thought when I was designing the treatment 
conditions for this experiment. Given the partisan divide in support, voter identification 
was not an ideal issue area within which to embed the experimental manipulations. 
Still, some interesting findings percolated from the research design as it was 
crafted, particularly around partisan trends in racial message reception and its impact on 
subsequent political opinions. Republican voters are far more responsive to partisan 
motivation than to racial norms. Republican voter support for the Republican candidate 
remains relatively high and stable compared to co-partisan support for the Democratic 
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candidate which rises and falls in light of the nature of the racial appeal to which they 
were exposed.  
In Chapter Five it became clear that the drop in candidate favorability related to 
exposure to an explicit-Black appeals is piled upon Democratic candidates. Democratic 
voters significantly punish Democratic candidates who traffic in explicitly, anti-Black 
appeals. While Republican support for the Democratic candidate does not drop 
significantly in the explicit-Black condition compared to the control, the difference in 
support for Republican and Democratic candidates leveraging the same explicitly, anti-
Black appeal is both large and significant. Compared to the control, Republican 
candidates peddling explicit-Black appeals do not experience any drop in candidate 
favorability among Republican voters and any the negative movement among Democratic 
voters is not statistically significant. Again, the voter ID issue may be contributing to 
differential partisan baselines that dampen part of the impact of the racial appeals in 
different conditions. 
These findings suggest that the norm of racial equality is neither universally 
applied nor adhered to among partisans. Among Democrats, the norm of racial (African 
American) equality seems intact and that it serves as a powerful constraint on both racist 
candidate rhetoric and the expression of racist attitudes among voters as Mendelberg 
originally articulated in The Race Card (2001). However, Republican candidates are not 
penalized for making explicit-Black appeals by either Republican or Democratic voters. 
It is as if the norm of African American equality no longer applies to Republican 
candidates. Contemporary Republican candidates seem to have carte blanche for making 
racist, anti-Black appeals without fear of voter backlash—from neither Republican nor 
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Democratic voters. As such, there is no need or motivation to conceal an anti-Black 
appeal in implicit rhetoric and accordingly there are no additional points earned for dog-
whistle political campaign appeals. 
It is interesting that although Democratic voters fervently disavow explicit, anti-
Black appeals presented by Democratic candidates, they are not immune to expressing 
racialized thinking when it appears that they have sufficient political cover and/or the 
partisan motivation to do so. Co-partisan, tacit-Black appeals do not register significant 
positive favorability ratings for Democrats vis-à-vis the control. However, when exposed 
to a tacit-Black appeal, there is a significant difference between the favorability ratings 
Democratic voters assign to Republican and Democratic candidates. Even as the voter ID 
issue may dampen some of the impact of the effect, differences in form and content are 
perceived and partisans are motivated to act accordingly on subtle, anti-Black appeals. 
This finding also partially supports Mendelberg’s (2001) hypothesis that when racial 
appeals are sufficiently coded and offer the message recipient a degree of plausible 
deniability, those messages will be able to mobilize anti-Black affect in the expression of 
subsequent political decisions. 
Overall, this work helps to flesh out more of what Tesler (2016) refers to as the 
“two sides of racialization.” Democrats are frequently staking out policy positions and 
political behaviors that reflect racial egalitarianism, while Republicans appear to be 
digging their heels in on racial conservativism. Democrats appear to be alone in their 
commitment to racial egalitarianism and are left bear the full responsibility and burden of 
maintaining this racial norm. This finding has significant implications for the 
maintenance and effectiveness of the norm of racial [sic] equality. 
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In The Race Card (2001), Mendelberg outlines the factors that help constitute a 
norm of equality and then goes on to explain that the norm must be actively sustained by 
political elites and the media. Bi-partisan, universal support a prerequisite of norm 
development for it to have the countervailing force that we see from the norm of African 
American equality. If a norm is not actively and universally upheld by the rhetoric and 
public discourse of political elites, its ability to effectively guide individual behavior is 
diminished. A potential snowball effect creates the risk of the unravelling of the norm 
altogether. As Republicans abandon the norm of racial equality and attempt to win votes 
with explicitly racist rhetoric, it puts pressure on Democrats to seek out electoral 
advantages by defecting to the same rhetorical strategies.  
 
A CHALLENGE TO THE POWER OF UNCONSCIOUS AWARENESS 
 The fact that partisans react differently to the same messages depending on 
whether they were received from Democratic or Republican candidates, suggests that 
message reception and acceptance is not an automatic process. Throughout this study, 
significant differences in the reception and acceptance of the same message are apparent. 
Partisanship, racial resentment, and message construction all have mediating effects on 
the expression of candidate favorability scores. I take the differential impacts of these 
independent variables as evidence that some information processing and decision-making 
is happening in the time between primed racial considerations and subsequent 
expressions of political opinion or behavior.  
If it is the case that the expression of a primed racial attitude is not an unconscious 
act as Mendelberg (2001) argues in The Race Card, it may be more akin to a “motivation 
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to control prejudice” (Blinder et al. 2013) in particular contexts. Blinder and colleagues 
(2013) suggest that the expression of political decisions is the outcome of an interaction 
between an individual’s personal motivation to control prejudice and the extent to which 
the decision-making context brings that motivation to mind. This dual-processing model 
implies that voters are actively working to determine whether they must exert some 
measure of norm-based cognitive control over their political expressions. It is as though 
individuals are actively gauging whether there is sufficient political cover to make it safe 
to express the racial considerations in their minds. Meaning that the function of subtlety, 
or “plausible deniability” in a racial appeal is not so much for the racial content to go 
“undetected,” but to provide a justification for opinions and behaviors that run against the 
grain of the prevailing egalitarian norm (where one exists). 
 I cannot reach a definitive statement regarding the mechanism at play here as the 
answers to these puzzles are beyond the scope of what is tested for in this study. As far as 
I understand, there is not much published research that explores the mechanism by which 
primed racial considerations are expressed. This would be a fruitful area of inquiry as the 
prime-to-expression link is a significant key to understanding the IE model, or how 
priming is related to expressions racial/out-group prejudice more generally. 
 
BACK TO (METHODOLOGICAL) BASICS  
A superficial replication of the components of survey experiments on racial 
priming can erode their methodological integrity in a way similar to how a message can 
get distorted during a game of telephone. In that process, we lose track of the theoretical 
assumptions that drive the research design and the relationships between variables and 
146
their measurements. I call for a robust assessment of how experiments on racial priming 
are being designed and executed. 
 In my own review of the literature, I have found several design trends in survey 
experiment research design that should be reexamined and/or replaced. First, there is a 
trend of exposing respondents to racial appeals embedded in an OpEd or narrative 
vignette that is authored by some one other than the candidate leveraging the appeal. 
While there is a degree of external validity here in that it mirrors the way that voters may 
consume news or other information about the candidate, it muddies the waters related to 
the attribution of measured the effects. It is not clear which stimulus respondents are 
reacting to when additional context and characters are layered into the experimental 
manipulations. 
For studies of racial appeals in campaign communications, the best practice 
should be to use fictional campaign literature or video ads that directly assess the impact 
of candidate appeals on voters’ political opinions and behavior. While in the past this 
option may have been cost-prohibitive, today there are a number of affordable computer 
programs and apps that can assist lay people who do not have design expertise in content 
creation. This affords the researcher a greater degree or control and precision in isolating 
the factors that impact respondent behavior. 
Second, the priming literature tends to focus on issues that are stereotypically 
associated with the racial groups that are being studied, ie.: “crime” or “welfare” for 
Blacks and “immigration” for Latinos. Of course, there is a desire for the treatment issues 
to be relevant and connected to the groups in question, but as recent research has 
suggested, “highly congruent group-issue pairings” (Reny et al. 2019) may have a 
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priming effect when the issue is presented alone. Variation in the issues or in the 
presence/absence of the paired group could be intentionally included in the treatment 
conditions in order to account for their impact on respondent decisions and behavior. 
Otherwise, it would be preferred to identify issues that are race and/or party neutral (or 
for which there is bi-partisan support) that are responsive to racial cues. 
Finally, an effort should be made to ensure that treatment content is reflective of 
the definitions and operationalizations embedded in the theory. In earlier chapters, I 
called attention to the way that the term “implicit appeal” became operationalized as 
“code word and racial imagery.” This operationalization drifted until it was no longer 
capturing the key features of “implicitness”—namely whether it seemed tangential or 
incidental to race. Similarly, as racial nouns and adjectives no longer have the same 
negative connotations today’s most racial political context, it will be important to 
distinguish racial from racist appeals (Valenzuela and Reny 2020). Racial appeals may 
have explicitly, race-positive messages whereas racist appeals would be crafted to evoke 
fear and negative stereotypes or emotions. 
 
ON RACE AND IMMIGRATION BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 
 This study works to move the implicit-explicit theory of racial priming beyond the 
Black-white paradigm in which it was originally conceived. Due to their population 
growth and political salience, Latinos and other non-Black minorities are increasingly 
targeted by racial appeals. However, theories and models that were developed to explain 
Black-white dynamics cannot simply replace one minority group for another. The unique 
racialization and triangulation of racial groups needs to be accounted for and empirically 
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tested before we can make claims about a theory’s ability to account for other racial 
group dynamics. 
However, the Black-white paradigm continues to have relevance for the context in 
which contemporary politics takes place. Like Niambi M. Carter (2019) I believe that the 
Black-white paradigm is an important lens through which we can view race relations in 
the United States. Particularly, because whiteness and Blackness presently anchor the two 
poles of “relative valorization” (Kim 1999) along a racial hierarchy, it creates part of the 
context in which other racialized group dynamics play out. Scholarship must take 
seriously the ways in which non-Black minorities are racialized within the context of and 
in relation to the Black-white paradigm, in order to understand how and when theories 
and models developed to account for Black-white relations travel to other groups. 
Relatedly, I continue to find importance in the examination of the impact of racial 
appeals on white political opinions and behavior. While interesting insights regarding 
race relations will certainly come from scholarship that centers the impact of racial 
appeals on non-white voters, whites continue to possess the greatest amount of political, 
social, and economic privilege that weights their attitudes more heavily than others in the 
political arena. It is therefore valuable to understand the unique or differential impacts 
that negative racial appeals featuring non-Black minorities have on white voters. With 
which constructions of racial appeals do whites double down on the boundaries of 
whiteness and with which constructions do they begin to demonstrate an ability to stand 
up on behalf of others? 
By comparatively assessing the ways that parallel experimental treatments for 
Blacks and Latinos impact white voters, this study illuminates the similar and dissimilar 
149
elements of the groups’ social constructions as well as the assumptions embedded in 
implicit-explicit model. My work provides a fresh take on the theory of racial priming by 
a looking at the individual axioms at the foundation of the IE model and whether those 
assumptions are met by the groups’ positionality and/or present political context 
surrounding that group.  
The conception of Latino “foreigner positionality” clearly has little to do with 
individual citizenship status and yet it appears to be a significant concept in the 
construction of “Latino” in the imaginations of whites. It will be interesting to see 
whether the formal political path—national social movements, legislative victories, and 
judicial rulings—through  which African Americans were able to achieve normative 
egalitarianism is available to Latinos, or if that “foreigner” status will hamper their 
efforts. More interesting still is whether justice claims directed at Latino positionality can 













CCES 2016 UMass Modules: 
The 2016 University of Massachusetts Modules were purchased as part of the 2016 
CCES. The 2016 CCES survey was conducted over the Internet by YouGov. YouGov 
used a matched random sample methodology. The response rate was 42% after YouGov 
initially contacted more that 150,000 respondents for the pool of matches in the sample. 
The Common Content was asked of 64,600 adults interviewed in October 2016 (for pre-
election data), and in November 2016 (for post-election data).  
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APPENDIX B  
 
 
Mailer Treatment Images: 
 













A3.2: Voter ID Issue Mailer, Control 
 
 
A3.3: Voter ID Issue Mailer, Explicit-Black 
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A3.4: Voter ID Issue Mailer, Implicit-Black 
 
 
A3.5: Voter ID Issue Mailer, Tacit-Black 
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A3.6: Voter ID Issue Mailer, Explicit-Latino 
 
 
A3.7: Voter ID Issue Mailer, Implicit-Latino 
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ANES Racial Resentment questions: 
1. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked 
their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. 
2. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it 
difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class. 
3. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve.  
4. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only 
try harder they could be just as well off as whites. 
 
 
Latino Resentment questions (asked post-test only): 
1. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked 
their way up. Latinos should do the same without any special favors. 
2. Generations of land occupation and discrimination have created conditions that 
make it difficult for Latinos to work their way out of the lower class. 
3. Over the past few years, Latinos have gotten less than they deserve.  
4. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Latinos would only 





Chapter 5 Tables: 
 
 
Table A5.1: Two-tailed tests of significance for mean candidate favorability co- and 
cross-partisan appeals to Republican voters 
 








t value p= N power 
Control 71.47 61.74 9.73 .008** 86 0.7757 
Black-
explicit 
70.97 56.81 14.17 .007** 99 0.7865 
Black-
implicit 
71.34 62.11 9.23 .025* 81 0.5943 
Black-
tacit 
68 61.62 6.38 0.124 100 0.3346 
Latino-
explicit 
75.67 67.68 7.99 .026* 94 0.6355 
Latino-
implicit 
72.72 62.58 10.15 .033* 90 0.5594 
Latino-
tacit 
75.53 63.68 11.85 .006** 86 0.7775 
 
Table A5.2: Two-tailed tests of significance for mean candidate favorability co- and 
cross-partisan appeals to Democratic voters 
 








t value p= N power 
Control 38.11 44.16 -6.05 0.186 100 0.265 
Black-
explicit 
33.46 26.7 6.75 0.179 111 0.2701 
Black-
implicit 
36.96 43.84 -6.88 0.157 112 0.3024 
Black-
tacit 
30.4 48.45 -18.05 .000*** 98 0.9632 
Latino-
explicit 
44.09 43.24 0.843 0.883 87 0.0524 
Latino-
implicit 
42 45.63 -3.63 0.524 95 0.0967 
Latino-
tacit 
44.04 51.37 -7.33 0.169 105 0.2802 
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